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INTRODUCTION
hat would the U.S. Supreme Court have learned fromEu-
rope had it embarked on a comparative law inquiry for
the sake of decidingObergefell v. Hodges¸ the historical case that
affirmed the constitutional protection of same-sex marriage in
the United States?1 Experience suggests that, had the court
looked at European sources for inspiration, it could have mis-
read them.
A lot of ink has been spilled2 on the U.S. Supreme Court’s prac-
tice of quoting foreign sources and using foreign materials.3 This
debate goes beyond the legal terrain and reaches the realm of
politics, deepening the divide between U.S. liberals, who support
resorting to foreign law while adjudicating, and conservatives,
who oppose this practice.4 But, the recent controversy over the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage has given the debate over
the recourse to foreign law the chance to free itself from parti-
sanship.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell famously affirmed the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage but did not quote foreign
law in its reasoning, despite relying on Lawrence v. Texas, which
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. SeeDavid S. Law, Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 927, 935 (2015).
3. See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND
THENEWGLOBAL REALITIES (2015).
4. See Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV.
219, 219 (2014).
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famously did cite to law from outside the United States.5 Ober-
gefell resolved a circuit split6 created by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in DeBoer v. Snyder, which drew from foreign
sources in ruling that the U.S. Constitution did not protect the
right to same-sex marriage.7 Judge Jeffrey Sutton, who penned
the decision in DeBoer v. Snyder, reasoned:8
[T]he European Court of Human Rights ruled only a few years
ago that European human rights laws do not guarantee a right
to same-sex marriage. Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, 2010. . . . “The
area in question,” it explained . . . remains “one of evolving
rights with no established consensus,” which means that
States must “enjoy [discretion] in the timing of the introduction
of legislative changes.” . . . It reiterated this conclusion . . . de-
claring that “the margin of appreciation to be afforded” to
States “must still be a wide one.” Hämäläinen v. Finland,
[2014].9
The opinion of the Sixth Circuit also added:
Our Supreme Court relied on the European Court’s gay-rights
decisions in Lawrence. . . . What neutral principle of constitu-
tional interpretation allows us to ignore the European Court’s
same-sex marriage decisions when deciding this case? If the
point is relevant in the one setting, it is relevant in the other.10
Judge Sutton took inspiration from the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) to conclude that the same-sex marriage is-
sue had to be decided by the states. At the same time, Judge
Sutton called for consistency by the U.S. Supreme Court in citing
the practices of other countries and made this conservative ar-
gument, in part, on the basis of foreign law.
While the majority inObergefell did not rely on foreign sources
in its decision, admittedly, some of the judges of the U.S. Su-
preme Court who dissented made foreign law-based arguments
in favor of the preservation of heterosexual marriage. But, such
5. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Han-Ru Zhou, A Con-
textual Defense of “Comparative Constitutional Common Law,” 12 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 1034 (2014).
6. Lyle Denniston, Sixth Circuit: Now, A Split on Same-Sex Marriage,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 6, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2014/11/sixth-circuit-the-split-on-same-sex-marriage/.
7. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 417.
10. Id.
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references were extremely vague. For example, Chief Justice
John Roberts spoke about a world in turmoil, with “countries
overseas democratically accepting profound social change, or de-
clining to do so.”11 Justice Samuel Alito lamented that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling was at odds with “a great variety of
countries and cultures all around the globe.”12 Such phrasings
lack the precision that Judge Sutton offered when he wrote the
opinion for the Sixth Circuit. Overall, however, the justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court avoided using comparative law in ana-
lyzing Obergefell.
This has not always been the case. In the recent past, the U.S.
Supreme Court looked abroad for inspiration and useful compar-
ison on generally divisive issues such as the death penalty,13 ho-
mosexual relationships,14 and federalism.15 But, as this article
will demonstrate, the court’s explorations in foreign law
prompted scattered skepticism and even led to strong political
confrontations. Thus, the court in Obergefell may have decided
not to look in order to avoid adding criticism to such a hotly de-
bated topic as same-sex marriage through the utilization of con-
tentious arguments drawn from foreign countries. This article
will explore the presuppositions and implications involved when
judges look to foreign law to make their decisions. It will main-
tain that learning from other courts is not only legitimate but
also prudent, so long as this practice finds its proper place:
namely, as long as it provides U.S. judges with fresh perspec-
tives and crafted arguments instead of merely backing their own
opinions. Looking at foreign law should be a disciplined practice
that examines the details of foreign legal wisdom to discern its
underpinnings and structure. This understanding can renew the
genuine practice of using comparative law in adjudication while
removing it from political partisanship.16
11. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
13. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
16. See Basil Markesinis, National Self-Sufficiency or Intellectual Arro-
gance? The Current Attitude of American Courts Towards Foreign Law, 65
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 301, 323 (2006) (discussing the political salience of using for-
eign law).
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The focus of this article is largely descriptive since it starts
from the U.S. use of foreign citations and draws a picture of how
U.S. Supreme Court justices understand the legal orders from
which they draw. It concentrates on concrete examples of legal
borrowing to explore the conditions under which the use of for-
eign ideas is accurate and whether their use is appropriate. It
aims to demonstrate that inquiries into comparative law can be
a valid part of drafting a judicial opinion when those who cite
locate foreign bodies of law within their legal contexts and try to
understand both the original context and application to U.S.
courts. Thus, this article will address an area of law not yet ad-
equately considered by legal scholarship. It will provide a de-
tailed analysis of certain foreign sources utilized by the U.S. Su-
preme Court and will contrast their actual meaning against the
court’s interpretation at the time of the decisions.
Part I will briefly describe the controversy of U.S. courts’ cita-
tions to foreign decisions. It will discuss the main reasons why
the use of foreign sources remains highly contested among U.S.
judges and scholars and will weigh them against the reasons ad-
vocated by those who favor the practice of drawing from foreign
jurisdictions. Finally, it will place the prevailing opinions about
foreign citation usage in the United States within the global dis-
course on the utilization of foreign sources.
Part II will analyze the contentious U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions containing foreign citations that fueled debate on the uti-
lization of foreign law within U.S. legal scholarship. It deter-
mines that much of the criticism of the court’s use of such
sources is well-founded, not because of the citations themselves
but because such citations either misunderstand the foreign de-
cisions or legislative provisions they quote or make inappropri-
ate use of them. Part II continues by providing a detailed expla-
nation of each of these mistakes and singles out those occasions
in which the use of foreign materials proved to be appropriate or
at least respectful of the quoted sources.
Part III will summarize how the U.S. Supreme Court inter-
prets foreign legal orders and will contrast the court’s opinion
with the reality of such legal orders. It will show that, in the
past, when the court sought to use foreign law, it overlooked the
important features and structural differences of foreign legal
cultures. Ultimately, had the court considered these aspects in
the past, its appreciation of foreign law would have been more
nuanced and probably more useful. Foreign sources could have
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thus provided more information to the court without affecting its
autonomous and objective judgement.
Part IV will explore the practice of citing to foreign jurisdic-
tions as an instructive praxis that can help judges. It maintains
that foreign laws are permissible sources for the court to reflect
on, but not rely on, when the justices make decisions. Compara-
tive law should be used by the U.S. Supreme Court simply to
enhance justices’ ability to see aspects of a controversy that they
would otherwise overlook. To achieve this goal, the contexts from
which foreign sources are drawn must also be explored. Such ex-
plorations include the institutional scenarios in which they de-
veloped as well as their legal status.
Part V will draw conclusions from this analysis, explaining
that engaging in comparative law is not necessarily a partisan
practice, so long as justices do not choose foreign legal concepts
to simply back the decision the court will make. Rather, compar-
ative law analysis should be used because it sheds light on the
case and the legal issues at stake. Comparative law inquiries can
deepen legal reasoning but cannot substitute it.
In exploring these matters, this article will focus on U.S. Su-
preme Court citations that involve the European Union and the
so-called European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),17
which are among the most common foreign sources that U.S.
courts have relied upon. This article neither challenges the out-
come of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have utilized
such sources nor criticizes the case law that they have helped to
build. It only focuses on the role that foreign jurisprudence
played in the drafting of these opinions and, most importantly,
how the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the foreign jurispru-
dence it quoted.
I. THEU.S. CONTROVERSY OVER FOREIGN CITATIONS: AN
OVERVIEW
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that cite foreign statutes
and provide readings of foreign decisions are quite few,18 espe-
cially when compared with other common law jurisdictions, such
as South Africa, Canada, or Australia.19 Although commentators
17. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
18. Law, supra note 2, at 934.
19. Zhou, supra note 5.
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prophesized that the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of foreign law
would increase over time,20 in reality, the number of citations is
decreasing.21 Academic, legal, and political forces are all at work
in the decrease of the use of foreign sources in U.S. decisions.
A. The Reputation of Comparative Law in the United States
Law schools in the United States have classically deprioritized
comparative law,22 and, as a result, comparative law studies
have developed23 more slowly than other disciplines.24 Thus, for-
eign sources are often overlooked and misunderstood. These fac-
tors also raise doubts regarding the relevancy of foreign sources
to and compatibility with domestic legal reasoning.25
Additionally, legal critiques raise strong doubts about the le-
gitimacy, appropriateness, and the genuine, unbiased purpose of
foreign citations in U.S. jurisprudence; and the outcomes of
these analyses do not persuade scholars such as Professor Mary
Ann Glendon, who writes that “the benefits outnumber the
drawbacks.”26 Inquiries from foreign law would not be just time-
consuming or valueless; they would even be inappropriate and
counterproductive to the adjudication of legal disputes.
As for the issue of legitimacy, because the U.S. Supreme Court
must expound the U.S. Constitution,27 critics maintain that for-
eign law should not be weighed when interpreting it. More
broadly, they believe that foreign law should not affect the U.S.
20. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court
and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile
Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. &MARY L. REV. 743, 893 (2005).
21. Han-Ru Zhou provides some statistics in this regard. The U.S. Supreme
Court quoted foreign sources in 7.2% of its cases from 1984–1990, 5.6% from
1990–1999, and 3.5% from 2000–2008. Zhou, supra note 5.
22. David S. Law, Constitutional Convergence and Comparative Compe-
tency: A Reply to Professors Jackson and Krotoszynski, 66 ALA. L. REV. 145, 150
(2014).
23. For some comforting developments in this area, see Mary Ann Glendon,
Comparative Law in the Age of Globalization, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2014)
(“Over a hundred law schools have become sustaining members of the Ameri-
can Association for the Comparative Study of Law (now the American Society
of Comparative Law).”).
24. Ugo Mattei, An Opportunity Not to Be Missed: The Future of Compara-
tive Law in the United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 716 (1998).
25. Law, supra note 2, at 1020.
26. Glendon, supra note 23, at 2.
27. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 408 (1819).
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Supreme Court’s reasoning, let alone be relied upon. On the con-
trary, foreign citations would subject U.S. law to the oversight
of foreign institutions,28 thereby depriving the U.S. people of
their own sovereignty and hijacking the U.S. constitutional
structure.29 In this respect, so the argument goes, the use of for-
eign sources would be, as U.S. constitutionalism understands it,
intrinsically a betrayal of democracy and the rule of law.30
Appropriateness issues stem from the problems of taking a de-
cision out of its context.31 In other words, taking rules out of the
legal regimes in which they originally appeared could create
misunderstandings and prompt misuse by the U.S. Supreme
Court.32 Different constitutional environments and legal re-
gimes may lead to different decisions,33 although the institu-
tional framework may suggest that they act the same way on the
surface.34 For example, a civil law system balances statutes with
court decisions differently than a common law system.35 Conse-
quently, the U.S. Supreme Court can sometimes learnmore from
a French statute than from a French judicial statement.36
Legal critics also stress that the court would not be in the po-
sition to conduct any genuine inquiry into comparative law be-
28. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the use of foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
29. Id.
30. David J. Seipp portrays these sorts of criticisms against the practice of
citing foreign law. See David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the
Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1417, 1446 (2006).
31. Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutionalism, Legal Education, and
Civic Attitudes: Reflections in Response to Professors Krotosynski and Law, 66
ALA. L. REV. 155, 157 (2014).
32. Id.
33. Ran Hirschl, In Search of an Identity: Voluntary Foreign Citations in
Discordant Constitutional Settings, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 547, 552 (2014).
34. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law (Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 26 (1991).
35. Id.
36. This is hardly understood by the phenomenon of judicial globalization,
which shows “deference not to foreign law or foreign national interests, but
specifically to foreign courts.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1112 (2000).
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cause it could not avoid selectiveness. Stated differently, per-
sonal preferences among judges,37 language skills,38 and the un-
availability of information would lead judges to focus39 only on
the sources that support their decision. Drawing from foreign
law would be a quintessentially selective practice: judges would
pick the foreign materials that they prefer, and their choice
would still be limited by the language barrier.
Finally, the understanding of foreign citations as an illegiti-
mate intrusion into the U.S. constitutional order has prompted
scattered political criticisms, which often state that the use of
foreign law undermines the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy.40
Federal judges quoting foreign sources have faced calls for im-
peachment.41 Candidates for judicial appointments routinely are
asked during U.S. Senate hearings whether they would look at
and cite foreign sources in their decision-making processes.42
Further, popular state initiatives have tried to pull foreign law
out of courts by banning judges from using it.43 As Professor
Roger Alford has shown, the lower courts’ response to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s merely limited interest in foreign law has been
almost unanimously negative.44
37. This concept is also called “cherry-picking.”Martin Gelter & Mathias M.
Siems, Citations to Foreign Courts—Illegitimate and Superfluous, or Unavoid-
able? Evidence from Europe, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 35, 40 (2014).
38. Hirschl, supra note 33, at 551.
39. Keep in mind that, “[a]ccording to recent polls, . . . 82 percent of Ameri-
cans believe that the Justices decide cases based on their personal views.” Eric
Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. &MARYL. REV. 667,
733 (2015).
40. Law, supra note 2, at 939–40.
41. Seipp, supra note 30, at 1418, 1422.
42. Gelter & Siems, supra note 37, at 36; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the Challenge of Resisting – or Engaging
– Transnational Constitutional Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 105, 110–11 (2014); Mark
C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557–
58 (2007); Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts and Constitutional Comparativism,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 649 (2008).
43. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. But see Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d
1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming an injunction against the Oklahoma ban).
More states are trying to limit or ban the use of foreign law in state courts. See
RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 146 (2014).
44. Alford, supra note 42, at 655–56.
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B. The Normative Project and U.S. Resistance to It
The three-layered criticism by academic, legal, and political
authorities underpins the deep concern that foreign citations
have more to do with specific political agendas45 than with en-
lightened judgment. Rather than being objective, informed judg-
ments based on U.S. law, comparative law inquiries are viewed
as a selective practice targeting U.S. laws and practices that do
not necessarily align with the judges’ own views.46
Admittedly, the contemporary hope that the U.S. Supreme
Court may one day welcome foreign citations as a token of a
broader consideration of comparative law seems to be part of a
normative project,47 which actually makes the use of foreign law
in adjudication even more controversial and problematic. The
proponents of such recourse to foreign law conceive the highest
courts of the world as positively involved in not only transna-
tional dialogue for informative purposes but also as participants
in a normative enterprise.48 This initiative extends worldwide,49
blends international law with national law in the name of pro-
gress,50 focuses its efforts on developing a body of “generic con-
stitutional law,”51 and finds its driving force in judicial activ-
ism.52 This is quite a revolutionary landscape in light of the fact
that, only twenty-five years ago, U.S. judges had the reputation
of being “less inclined than the scholar or legislator to examine
45. Christopher McCrudden, Transnational Culture Wars, 13 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 434, 456 (2015).
46. Comparative law supporters seem to have a mainly liberal agenda. This
agenda, however, may change over time. As Roger Alford pointed out, the in-
famous case, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407, 475 (1856), went in the
opposite direction, using generic references to the law of other nations to deny
African Americans full rights. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International
Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 69 n.94 (2004); see
also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 20, at 802.
47. But see Veronika Fikfak, English Courts and the ‘Internalisation’ of the
European Convention of Human Rights? – Between Theory and Practice 23
(Univ. of Cambridge, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 37/2015,
2015).
48. Mattei, supra note 24, at 709.
49. Alford, supra note 46, at 57.
50. For an overview of the evolutionary reading of international law, see
Jochen von Bernstorff, International Legal Scholarship as a Cooling Medium
in International Law and Politics, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 977, 979 (2014).
51. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 662,
725 (2005).
52. Zhou, supra note 5.
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the production of other countries.”53 Therefore, it is no surprise
that U.S. legal scholars and the U.S. people at large are partic-
ularly concerned that such a “rise of world constitutionalism”54
would result in a deprivation of the democratic character and
the sovereignty of the people of the United States. Skepticism of
the United States with respect to drawing from foreign influ-
ence, however, is not simply derived from originalism55 or any
other inward-looking type of constitutional interpretation. The
rejection of foreign law is a combination of at least three struc-
tural factors in the U.S. legal tradition: namely, the rule of stare
decisis, the fact that the United States has not developed from a
preceding supranational legal order, and the foundational char-
acter of U.S. constitutionalism.
First, although the role of stare decisis in domestic adjudica-
tion is debated, it is beyond doubt that U.S. academics and
judges are equally concerned that judicial decisions are made in
accordance with precedent.56 Legal regimes that care about prec-
edents do not take them lightly.57 As a result, the more authori-
tative the role that foreign precedents have in their domestic de-
cisions, the less likely it is that U.S. judges will feel at ease with
quoting and incorporating them in their reasoning.
Second, many countries that indulge in foreign citations un-
derstand themselves as legally or traditionally part of a broader
legal order.58 This is true for Commonwealth countries,59 which,
for centuries, traded their own judicial precedents when they
53. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 395 (1991).
54. To use the expression coined by Bruce Ackerman. Bruce Ackerman, The
Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1997).
55. On the breadth and nuance of this theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE
(Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
56. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 411, 412–13 (2010).
57. Id. at 413.
58. Wayne Sandholtz, How Domestic Courts Use International Law, 38
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 595, 595 (2015).
59. See generally Stephen Garbaum, The New CommonwealthModel of Con-
stitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001) (discussing the commonalities
among state members of the Commonwealth and the recent development of a
shared understanding of constitutionalism among them).
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were subject to British rule60 and still share and draw infor-
mation from each other.61 This is equally true for European
countries, which, after World War II, committed to sharing legal
projects through the European Union and the Council of Eu-
rope.62 On the contrary, vast portions of U.S. academia63 catego-
rize international law—which, as a discipline, focuses on inter-
national organizations and human rights—and comparative
law—which traditionally compares different state systems—un-
der the same label, although their views are not uniform in how
they look at the two categories.64 For example, many academics
treat both international and comparative law with equal suspi-
cion,65 while others intertwine interest in international law with
curiosity (and even engagement) in comparative law.66 If a coun-
try understands itself as being part of a broader legal order that
connects people through international law, this will probably po-
sition it to borrow from other countries’ legal orders. Conversely,
tenuous U.S. relations with international law67 cause skeptical
attitudes toward comparative law as a useful tool of adjudica-
tion.
60. HIRSCHL, supra note 43, at 35.
61. VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL
ERA 96 (2010).
62. The Council of Europe is a supranational organization that covers forty-
seven European states and aims to promote human rights, democracy, and the
rule of law throughout its territories and globally. See COUNCIL OF EUR.,
http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). The nature
and the goal of the European Union and of the Council of Europe’s institutions
will be discussed below. See infra Part II.B.
63. JACKSON, supra note 61, at 169–70 (sketching out the differences be-
tween international law and comparative law).
64. Interestingly, Steven G. Calabresi and Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl began
their more-than-two-centuries-long parade of U.S. Supreme Court citations of
foreign law with the classical work The Law of Nations. Calabresi & Zimdahl,
supra note 20, at 757; see also JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO
ALLMANKIND”: FOREIGN LAWS IN AMERICANCOURTS 8 (2012).
65. Glendon, supra note 23, at 24.
66. For a discussion on the intellectual pressure that international law
scholars exerted on comparative law studies in order to form a cosmopolitan
project of global law, see David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law
and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9, 11, 31 (1999).
67. The U.S. Supreme Court’s attitude toward international law, however,
is more nuanced than is commonly portrayed. See Gráinne de Bŭrca, Interna-
tional Law Before the Courts: the EU and the US Compared, 55 VA. J. INT’L L.
685, 723–26 (2015).
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The third factor is linked to the second and relates to the very
foundation of U.S. constitutionalism. As Professor David Fon-
tana points out, the U.S. Constitution did not only establish the
legal order; rather, it established the whole U.S. identity.68 Con-
stitutional foundations were concurrently political and social.69
This fact makes the constitutional culture largely centripetal:
the whole political community identifies with its attachment to
the U.S. text.70 Unless foreign law illuminates the U.S. Consti-
tution, any foreign interference with constitutional interpreta-
tion amounts to an interference with the very foundations of
U.S. society. Such preoccupations are absent, for instance, in Eu-
ropean countries, where statehood long predated constitutional
texts, or in Canada, where political loyalties characterized its
development and where English, French, and U.S. law are incor-
porated into Canadian law.71
The worldwide normative project72 that the U.S. legal culture
largely opposes is occasionally rooted in the so-called “Condorcet
Theorem,”73 named after the great French philosopher of the
revolutionary era, the Marquis de Condorcet, whose “vision of
law and politics was distinctly ‘universalist,’ imagining all peo-
ple everywhere seeking the correct answer to questions of law
and policy.”74 While multiple versions of the Condorcet Theorem
exist, the applicable version for the purposes of this article “sug-
gests that the decision of a majority in a group of similar and
independent decision-makers is more likely to be correct than
the decision of any one member of that group.”75 In other words,
the version of the Condorcet Theorem that the supporters of this
68. David Fontana, Response: Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV.See
Also 189, 190 (2010), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1409&context=faculty_publications.
69. HIRSCHL, supra note 43, at 145.
70. Fontana, supra note 68, at 196.
71. H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILLL.J. 261, 289 (1987).
72. Carl Baudenbacher, Judicial Globalization: New Developments or Old
Wine in New Bottles?, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 505, 505 (2015).
73. Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theo-
rem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002).
74. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution: A Re-
sponse to the Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2007).
75. Shai Dothan, Why Granting States a Margin of Appreciation Supports
the Formation of a Genuine European Consensus 4, 5 (iCourts Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 22, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2597949.
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normative project seem to entertain proposes that a significant
exploration of the different legal trends that inhabit modern de-
mocracies can point domestic judges in the right direction.76
The worldwide trading in legal ideas composes a “global com-
munity of law”77—a concept that depicts a new legal order ex-
tending worldwide and stems from a globalized environment in
which persons and goods move from one legal environment to
another rather easily.78 This scenario creates legal chaos,79
which in turn calls for strong judicial interventionism. Given
that the national level has become inadequate to regulate hu-
man activities that take place transnationally, if not worldwide,
only strong interactions between supranational courts and state
courts can put supranational social and economic phenomena in
check.80 The making of this global law takes place through both
periodic meetings among domestic and supranational judges
from different parts of the world81 and the domestic implemen-
tation of global trends through national court decisions.82
The idea of a global law era suffers from weak or nonexistent
democratic legitimation. Flowing spontaneously is the transna-
tional dialogue among judiciaries and the practice of borrowing
concepts and solutions.83 They do not stem from state-like demos
and are not the product of the democratic will of any people.84
76. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 131, 136 (2006).
77. Slaughter, supra note 36, at 1104.
78. Id. at 1103 (where the author states that “[t]he compression of distance
and the dissolution of borders that drives globalization has proved far more
efficient at producing global markets than global justice.”).
79. See On Reading Proust: Stephen Breyer, Interviewed by Ioanna Kohler,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/arti-
cles/2013/11/07/reading-proust/ [hereinafter Stephen Breyer Interview].
80. Baudenbacher, supra note 72, at 512.
81. Id. at 505.
82. MARTA CARTABIA & SABINO CASSESE, EUR. UNIV. INST., HOW JUDGES
THINK IN A GLOBALISED WORLD? EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES,
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 2 (2013), http://cad-
mus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/30057/2013_07-Pol-
icy%20Brief_RSCAS_GGP-WEB.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
83. Baudenbacher, supra note 72, at 505.
84. Stephen Breyer Interview, supra note 79; Sabino Cassese,Global Admin-
istrative Law: The State of the Art, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 465, 467 (2015).
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With few exceptions, the resort to foreign sources is not legiti-
mized directly by most countries’ constitutions.85 Further, even
when such allowances exist, courts are not given any instruc-
tions about where to look for solutions. They can still be selective
in which sources they use to base their decisions. This flexibility,
and the danger of selectiveness that flows from it, is greater for
countries that are not directly involved in supranational pro-
jects, such as EU countries or the states of the Commonwealth,
which have both a justification as well as logical boundaries in
judicial inquiries in foreign law.86
Courts can be selective in both the legal regimes they decide to
draw from as well as when they decide to draw. The incon-
sistency in the practice of quoting foreign sources is probably the
aspect that raises most doubt. For example, if a court cites for-
eign law almost daily—like Canadian87 or South African
courts88—then one can conclude that this is a standard compo-
nent of the adjudication process. But, the U.S. Supreme Court
engages in comparative inquiries only randomly and, more often
than not, with regard to ethically and politically divisive cases,89
such as death penalty issues or homosexual relations.90 The fact
that its practice is so rare and only deployed in hotly contested
matters confirms the impression that comparative jurispru-
dence of the U.S. Supreme Court is driven merely by some polit-
ical agenda, regardless of what it may be. After all, the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in DeBoer on same-sex marriage, which
prompted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari,
touched upon this point when it mentioned the necessity of look-
ing to foreign law consistently instead of occasionally.91 And by
85. South Africa, however, is a notable exception to this general rule. See S.
AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 39 (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court,
tribunal or forum . . . may consider foreign law.”).
86. As for the Commonwealth, see CALABRESI, supra note 55; as for the Eu-
ropean Union, see infra Part II.B.
87. Zhou, supra note 5.
88. Since 1994, “foreign law has been cited or referenced in more than half
of that country’s Constitutional Court rulings.” Hirschl, supra note 33, at 549.
89. This actually seems to be a trademark of the global practice of borrowing
ideas. See Gelter & Siems, supra note 37, at 71.
90. As will be discussed in infra Part II.
91. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (“What neutral prin-
ciple of constitutional interpretation allows us to ignore the European Court’s
same-sex marriage decisions when deciding this case? If the point is relevant
in the one setting, it is relevant in the other.”).
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quoting sources that merely back its decision, the impression is
further corroborated that the U.S. Supreme Court simply looks
for confirmation instead of additional wisdom in these sources.
Judges find a place for themselves in the world community of
courts not by simply quoting those foreign judgments that spe-
cifically support their reasoning but also through contrasting
their own decisions with those of other jurisdictions that took
different paths. For example, some years ago, the Czech Consti-
tutional Court gave a strong endorsement to the Europeaniza-
tion process in the Lisbon Treaty, openly stigmatizing the Ger-
man Constitutional Court, which had taken the opposite posi-
tion.92
Selectiveness, misuse, and lack of democratic accountability
are formidable criticisms of the U.S. Supreme Court’s resort to
foreign law. As a result, it is no surprise that, notwithstanding
the paucity of the court’s resort to foreign sources, this seldom-
used practice has prompted strong reactions. Using foreign law
in domestic adjudication gets to the core of democratic values,
activates the impression that there is a “juristocratic”93 threat,
and prompts questions about whether the judiciary is trying to
change the country’s mores through the judges’ own morals.94
Regardless of whether the use of comparative law in a decision
is substantial or limited, what we should monitor is the trans-
formation of foreign law into domestic law.95 If a foreign source
is treated as normative, to some extent, it becomes part of the
law of the land.96 In other words, the U.S. Supreme Court may
incorporate normative foreign law into U.S. law.97 The specific
weight of each citation may vary; but, citations, according to the
92. Mattias Wendel, Comparative Reasoning and the Making of a Common
Constitutional Law: EU-Related Decisions of National Constitutional Courts in
a Transnational Perspective, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 981, 988 (2013).
93. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THENEWCONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
94. For a discussion on the tensions between mores and morals, see Michel
Rosenfeld, A Comparativist Critique of U.S. Judicial Review of Fundamental
Rights Cases: Exceptionalisms, Paradoxes and Contradictions 27 (Cardozo Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 446, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2562717##.
95. For an explanation of international law’s internalization, see Fikfak, su-
pra note 47, at 2.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Glendon, supra note 23, at 9.
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global law paradigm, make the law of other nations part of U.S.
law.
C. The Urgent Need for an Alternative Understanding of For-
eign Law’s Contribution to Domestic Adjudication
The perils of indulging in comparative law derive from the in-
tellectual project behind this current practice of drawing inspi-
ration from foreign countries while deciding cases, not in the
practice in itself. Such perils cannot be avoided simply by forbid-
ding foreign citations because the issue of the use of foreign in-
fluences upon domestic judgments is not simply a matter of cita-
tion.98 While the opposition to the use of foreign law may dis-
courage foreign citations, it does not necessarily discourage their
influence. After all, if the criticisms mainly target the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s explicit citation of foreign sources, an easy
shortcut for judges who seek to use foreign ideas in their opin-
ions is to draw from them without displaying the source.99 Using
foreign law without quoting it is not transparent, but it avoids
criticism. The mere fact that U.S. quotations of foreign law are
rare may not say too much about the court’s actual practice.100
As a result, the case may be that judges do not disregard foreign
sources but appear to do so because they want the U.S. audience
to think that they do not look at them. Using foreign sources
without acknowledging them ultimately affects a court’s trans-
parency. Moreover, the lack of transparency has a paradoxical
result: although the strength and the reputation of a court
largely rests on the quality of its reasoning, in actuality, part of
its reasoning remains in the shadows precisely to reinvigorate
the court’s reputation.101
Judicial borrowings are not just a matter of citations.102 Cita-
tions testify that some resort to foreign materials was made; but,
the influence of other countries’ legal traditions on U.S. law does
98. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931
(2008).
99. Gelter & Siems, supra note 37, at 39.
100. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 42, at 137.
101. SeeMathilde Cohen,When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A
Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 488 (2015) (high-
lighting that judges in the past preferred to omit giving reasons for their deci-
sions in order to avoid annulment).
102. Law, supra note 2, at 946.
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not end with citations.103 It can even inspire indigenous U.S. de-
velopments that go much further than the initial references to
foreign law. For example, the longstanding legacy of the distinct
U.S. right to privacy, which was first affirmed in Griswold v.
Connecticut,104 finds its ancient roots in Warren and Brandeis’
article The Right to Privacy,105 which Griswold correctly
quoted.106 In their legal article, Warren and Brandeis strove to
find an equivalent in (or to introduce into) U.S. law the protec-
tion of dignity afforded under French law.107 In its opinion, how-
ever, Griswold carried no evidence of the French lineage to the
U.S. intellectual endeavor that led to a right to privacy.
Many legal ideas, such as privacy, have a transnational story
that encompasses both domestic and foreign legal experiences.
Why should a judge quote the domestic strands of legal thought
while remaining silent on the foreign ones in the same vein when
the latter strands can provide valuable insight about the entire
picture? After all, an insulated court is fictional, given the con-
tinuous flow of legal information across the globe.108 Stated an-
other way, “[i]n a modern, globalized society, knowledge is viral,
and once caught, cannot be easily shed. One cannot undo aware-
ness of same-sex marriage in Canada, state-sanctioned euthana-
sia in the Netherlands, or the decriminalization of many recrea-
tional drugs in Mexico.”109 As a result, judges cannot avoid being
informed about what happens outside the United States because
these events may give them issues to reflect upon while judging.
Parties and amici curiae normally draw from other jurisdic-
tions when litigating before the U.S. Supreme Court under the
assumption that foreign arguments could play some role in how
judges will decide the case.110 It is not a matter of what parties
and amici think about the validity of this process; rather, it is a
matter of how they think the court will make a decision. Con-
servative groups in the United States,111 which hardly approve
103. Id. at 948.
104. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
105. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
106. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511 n.1.
107. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 105, at 214.
108. JACKSON, supra note 61, at 5.
109. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 42, at 108.
110. McCrudden, supra note 45, at 434.
111. Id. at 449.
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of the practice of borrowing ideas from other countries,112 have
developed strategies that even support litigation abroad with
the expectation that foreign decisions will have an impact on do-
mestic ones.113 For instance, if such groups understand that the
ECtHR decisions can play some part in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reasoning on a similar issue relevant to their group, they
will participate in the ECtHR’s litigation, hoping that this may
affect how the U.S. Supreme Court will behave in the future.114
This was particularly true in Lawrence v. Texas,115 the U.S. Su-
preme Court decision that struck down the Texas ban on sod-
omy. Since the majority in Lawrence’s relied on ECtHR case law,
U.S. groups and individuals of different ideological orientations
have subsequently started to target the ECtHR with the hope of
influencing the U.S. Supreme Court in the future with respect
to their interests.116
While the U.S. Supreme Court seems to be reluctant to embark
on comparative law efforts while deciding, parties and amici do
not behave with that understanding. Resort to foreign sources is
“increasingly occurring in both sides of contested issues.”117 All
parties treat the U.S. Supreme Court as if it accepts comparative
law arguments, despite the court’s dearth of foreign law quota-
tions indicating otherwise.118 It is therefore safe to say that, alt-
hough sporadic, the U.S. Supreme Court’s utilization of foreign
sources in the past legitimizes parties’ resort to them in their
briefs and heightens the expectations that the court will, to some
extent, value them.119
In a sense, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to be in a catch-22:
quotations from foreign countries are criticized; yet, parties be-
fore it behave like the court uses foreign sources in making its
decisions. Further, the court’s reluctance in quoting foreign
sources is suspicious because its silence does not necessarily
mean that the court is immune from the influence of foreign law.
In 2005, Professors Steven Calabresi and Stephanie Dotson Zim-
dhal wrote the following in the context of Eighth Amendment
112. Id. at 450, 456.
113. Id. at 442.
114. Id. at 445.
115. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
116. McCrudden, supra note 45, at 451.
117. Id. at 459.
118. Id.
119. See Schauer, supra note 98, at 1959.
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cases: “With so many of the nine justices committed to looking
at foreign law, . . . the question is no longer whether but how the
Court will rely upon foreign law . . . in the future.”120 The answer
seems to be: quietly.
Moreover, many scholars suggest that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s authoritativeness is declining worldwide, precisely be-
cause it does not participate in this global dialogue of courts.121
Its reluctance to quote foreign jurisdictions is counterproductive
to the exportation of its own values.122 Case law of the United
States can only encounter foreign jurisdictions interested in U.S.
law if it utilizes foreign laws itself. If we consider the possibility
that the U.S. Supreme Court indulges in considering foreign ju-
risprudence but omits the acknowledgement of it formally, we
have the paradoxical result that the U.S. Supreme Court im-
ports more legal ideas, concepts, and influences than what it ex-
ports because it merely does not want to concede to what it is
importing. The alternative option of ignoring foreign legal wis-
dom is, of course, equally troubling. Open participation in a
global dialogue with normative effects must first respond to the
aforementioned criticisms: selectiveness, appropriateness, dem-
ocratic deficit, and politically driven results. All of the doubts
that have been raised so far make improbable the U.S. Supreme
Court’s explicit entrance into this dialogue. These improbabili-
ties, however, do not stem simply from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
reluctance to engage. They also derive from the very presuppo-
sitions of the transnational judicial dialogue.
D. The Scope of this Article
The normative project behind global law is selective. It accepts
only the constitutional theories that fit within its normative
scheme. It is no surprise that originalism and the combination
of a constitutional text with stare decisis123 tend not to be circu-
lated easily outside the United States.124 This is because legal
theories (good or bad) that address how to read constitutions in
a way that is consistent through time, and which carry the high-
est respect for history and local traditions, are largely confined
120. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 20, at 893.
121. Baudenbacher, supra note 72, at 526.
122. Slaughter, supra note 36, at 1119.
123. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 9 (2011).
124. CARTABIA&CASSESE, supra note 82, at 2.
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to U.S. legal discourse.125 They hardly fit within the global traf-
ficking of legal ideas and the circulation of arguments that pro-
mote legal change by using domestic and supranational judges
as proxies.
As this article will show, foreign law must be understood as a
valuable resource of crafted, articulated legal concepts that need
to be evaluated autonomously by the court that is willing to draw
from them126 rather than as a mere repository of ideas floating
independently from the legal systems in which they were
shaped. That said, foreign laws should not control domestic de-
cisions. They can only provide arguments that the U.S. Supreme
Court will find useful to understand and evaluate a case. To ap-
preciate how this can be done, this article will explore the U.S.
Supreme Court’s practice of excerpting foreign experiences,
largely focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court’s references to the
ECtHR and to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (later the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)), which are both
active in the global law community.
The ECtHR is “regarded as the poster child of international
human rights law.”127 The ECtHR provides the forum by which
individuals can complain that their state violated the rights en-
shrined to them under the ECHR.128 Its approach is “extremely
close to that of national constitutional courts,” and, in its judg-
ments, it occasionally defines itself as a “constitutional instru-
ment of European public order.”129 By policing the ECHR, an in-
ternational human rights treaty with forty-seven European
members, it exerts its power over almost nine hundred million
125. Id.
126. Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transna-
tional Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 499, 502–03 (2000).
127. Kai Möller, From Constitutional to Human Rights: On the Moral Struc-
ture of International Human Rights, 3 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 373, 398
(2014).
128. The relevant portion of the ECHR articulates: “To ensure the observance
[of] the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European
Court of Human Rights.” ECHR, supra note 17.
129. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
¶ 75 (1995); see Robin C.A. White & Iris Boussiakou, Separate Opinions in the
European Court of Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 37, 38 (2009); Wojciech
Sadurski, Is There Public Reason in Strasbourg? 35 (Sydney Law Sch. Re-
search Paper, Paper No. 15/46, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2603473.
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people.130 In an age in which “constitutionalism spilled over from
its traditional nation-state setting to find new horizons within
transnational and even to some extent global arenas,”131 the EC-
tHR is of paramount importance because it provides an example
of when human rights protection, constitutionalism, and the rule
of law are assimilated.
Moreover, the ECtHR understands itself as more than merely
a regional player. It looks worldwide to gather legal ideas and
incorporates them into its case law.132 Quoting the ECtHR,
therefore, can mean more than drawing from the shared under-
standing of human rights that permeates the states that com-
prise it. It can also mean responding to the ECHR’s universal
vocation133 and the principle that the liberties it enshrines are
morally just on a global scale.134
On the other hand, speaking strictly quantitatively, the possi-
bilities of quoting the CJEU’s decisions are technically fewer
since it covers “only” twenty-eight countries and, for a large part
of its history, has not focused on human rights.135 Rather, it has
mainly dealt with technical issues, such as limitations on the
free movement of goods136 or the liberalization of economic activ-
ities.137 As a result, its solutions are harder to export. Still, the
CJEU is an important global player: it draws from the laws of
the EU Member States, and occasionally from other legal re-
gimes as well, and its judgments are part of the law of the land
in EU countries. Moreover, its scope recently expanded to cover
130. Cohen, supra note 101, at 565.
131. Michel Rosenfeld, Is Global ConstitutionalismMeaningful or Desirable?,
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 177, 178 (2014).
132. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Comparative Law in the Reasoning of the
European Court of Human Rights, 10 U. C. DUBLIN L. REV. 109, 109 (2010).
133. Gelter & Siems, supra note 37, at 38.
134. For a discussion on the relationship between morality, universality, and
transnationalism, see Eric Blumenson, Four Challenges Confronting a Moral
Conception of Universal Human Rights, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 327, 336
(2015).
135. Joseph H. H. Weiler,Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Integration:
Iconography and Fetishism, 3 INT’L L.F. D. INT’L 227, 229 (2001).
136. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Bran-
ntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 (so-called “Cassis de Dijon case”).
137. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
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human rights.138 In this respect, the recent accession of the Eu-
ropean Union to the ECHR legitimized the European Union
through human rights discourse.139
Under the EU umbrella, European domestic courts have
started sharing their own decisions with their peers systemati-
cally,140 essentially making them available to the broadest public
audience worldwide. This exchange implies that dozens of Euro-
pean states share the same principles regarding the rule of law,
democracy, and human rights and spread them throughout the
world. To some extent, they seem to make materials available
for the enforcement of the Condorcet Theorem, which states that
the practice of a significant group of states indicates where the
majority141 is heading. European domestic courts, the CJEU and
the ECtHR talk to each other systematically, impacting each
other’s case law on a rather ordinary basis.
II. MISTAKEN CITATIONS
The picture of a European continent in the process of legal uni-
fication is appealing to those who wish to draw inspiration from
it. But, there may be hidden aspects of the process that must be
considered before drawing from European legal sources. An out-
sider to Europe should also account for the constitutional infra-
structure through which this process takes place, its principal
drivers, and its theoretical underpinnings before borrowing from
it. Part II will provide examples of when one of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s members overlooked some of these components and will
highlight the consequences that derived from them.
A. Lawrence v. Texas
The U.S. Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas was probably
the most famous occasion where the court drew from European
law in formulating its decision.142 Lawrence was significant be-
cause it overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, a U.S. Supreme Court
138. Machteld Inge van Dooren, The European Union and Human Rights:
Past, Present, Future, 26 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT J. INT’L&EUR. L. 47, 52 (2009).
139. Jed Odermatt, The EU’s Accession to the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights: An International Law Perspective, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 59,
71 (2014).
140. See The Network, NETWORKPRESIDENTS SUPREME JUD. CTS. EUR. UNION,
http://network-presidents.eu/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
141. Alford, supra note 46, at 59.
142. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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decision that upheld a Georgia law that sanctioned sodomy.143 In
Bowers, the court found that the prohibition on sodomy, which
sanctioned the behavior regardless of gender, could survive con-
stitutional scrutiny, as it did not conflict with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lawrence, however,
two male adults were charged under a Texas penal law that pro-
scribed intimate acts among homosexuals. Unlike the Georgia
law in Bowers, the law scrutinized in Lawrence targeted sodomy
only among homosexuals.144 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Lawrence held that a prohibition on sodomy could not stand and
overruled Bowers on the grounds of the due process clause.145
Realistically, the factual differences between Lawrence and
Bowers would have allowed the court to distinguish the two
cases to avoid overruling Bowers and strike down the Texas law
on the basis that it criminalized sodomy only between homosex-
uals as opposed to all individuals.146 Distinguishing the two
cases would have meant striking down laws that specifically tar-
geted homosexuals while leaving the penal prohibition on sod-
omy untouched. Instead, the court in Lawrence overruled Bow-
ers and created a precedent that would later be utilized to affirm
the existence of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
What is relatively unknown, however, is that Lawrence im-
pacted the use of comparative law in both litigation and U.S. ju-
risprudence.147 Before this decision, explorations in foreign law
aimed at determining “[w]hat the consequences of particular le-
gal rules had been when they were employed by a foreign legal
culture. In contrast, the Lawrence Court looked at foreign
sources of law for moral guidance as to what the content of Amer-
ican law ought to be.”148 Case law of the the ECtHR played a
significant role in the Lawrence decision. In the majority opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy stated:
[A]lmost five years before Bowers was decided the European
Court of Human Rights considered a case. . . . An adult male
resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homo-
sexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual con-
duct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. . . .
143. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 579.
146. Id. at 584.
147. McCrudden, supra note 45, at 449.
148. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 20, at 868.
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The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were in-
valid under the ECHR. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, [1981].
Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council
of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at
odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward
was insubstantial in our Western civilization. . . .
. . . To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding
in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court
of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision
in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P. G. & J. H. v. United
Kingdom, [2001]; Modinos v. Cyprus, [1993]; Norris v. Ireland,
[1988]. The right the petitioners seek in this case has been ac-
cepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries.149
The U.S. Supreme Court made some important reflections
here that are worthy of extensive consideration. First, it consid-
ered that Bowers directly contradicted (or was “at odds with”)
Dudgeon.150 Moreover, in Kennedy’s words, Bowers did not rely
on the “values [that U.S. citizens] share with a wider civiliza-
tion.”151 In fact, the ECtHR did not follow Bowers “but its own
decision in Dudgeon.”152 Second, the court stated that Dudgeon
set a line of reasoning153 that the ECtHR later confirmed in P.
G. & J. H. v. United Kingdom,Modinos v. Cyprus, and Norris v.
Ireland. Finally, Lawrence found Dudgeon particularly im-
portant because this ECtHR decision was “[a]uthoritative in all
countries that are members of the Council of Europe.”154
Each of these considerations requires adequate scrutiny. Alt-
hough the quoted material in Lawrence drew significant political
and scholarly attention, there seems to be relatively less famili-
arity among scholars with respect to the ECtHR case law that
Lawrence quoted for the purposes of assessing the quality of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s comparative law inquiry.155
149. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576 (2003).
150. Id. at 574. Literally, Dudgeon “is at odds with the premise in Bowers
that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.”
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 573.
155. Those who have devoted special attention to these aspects are Roger P.
Alford and Mary Ann Glendon. See Alford, supra note 46; Glendon, supra note
23, at 19.
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It is no surprise that Dudgeon was overlooked in U.S. aca-
demia. Those favoring and those criticizing the comparative in-
quiries made by the U.S. Supreme Court have a theoretical
rift.156While the average critic157 denounces all citations158 of for-
eign jurisprudence,159 those who defend its use state that learn-
ing from other countries is a legitimate, and even opportune,
part of the court’s work.160 Instead, it would be beneficial to an-
alyze the ECtHR’s case law directly to see if there is legal sub-
stance that the U.S. Supreme Court could engage with and
whether it respected the ECtHR’s approach.
1. Did Dudgeon Contradict Bowers? Contrasting the ECtHR’s
Dudgeon Decision with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Picture of It
The majority in Lawrence clearly sought judicial dialogue. It
used Dudgeon to rebut Bowers’ affirmation that antisodomy
laws are consistent with a sound legal civilization.161 The court’s
affirmation that “[t]he [ECtHR] has followed not Bowers but its
own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom”162 seemed to imply
that, had Bowers been a just decision, the ECtHR would have
made a U-turn after Dudgeon and followed Bowers instead.
Is this U.S. depiction of Bowers accurate? Was Dudgeon as
much of an implicit rejection of Bowers as Lawrence was? The
majority in Lawrence was aware of the powerful shift it was
making in the field of antisodomy laws. In its opinion, it stressed
its awareness and importance of previous case law but explained
why overruling Bowers was required:
The doctrine of stare decisis is essential. . . . [W]hen a Court is
asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional lib-
erty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of
156. But see Glendon, supra note 23, at 1.
157. For example, “[c]ritics argue that such references to foreign law are an
illegitimate, antidemocratic judicial usurpation of authority, or an effort to ob-
scure the absence of solid grounding in U.S. law for a result.” Vicki Jackson,
Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF., http://www.legalaf-
fairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_jackson_julaug04.msp (last visited
Dec. 23, 2015).
158. Id.
159. For a depiction of the debate, see Rosenkranz, supra note 74, at 1281–
83.
160. SeeUnited States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Wise parents
do not hesitate to learn from their children.”).
161. BREYER, supra note 3, at 238–39.
162. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
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that liberty cautions with particular strength against revers-
ing course. . . . The holding in Bowers, however, has not induced
detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where rec-
ognized individual rights are involved. . . . Bowers itself causes
uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its issuance
contradict its central holding.163
In a nutshell, the court opined that the doctrine of stare decisis
did not prevent, nor did it warn against, overruling the previous
decision on penal sanctions on sodomy. The societal reliance on
precedents required, instead of discouraged, overruling Bowers,
as Bowers itself created uncertainty.
Let us briefly consider Dudgeon. In 1976, Mr. Dudgeon, a ho-
mosexual man who lived in Northern Ireland, filed a claim with
the ECtHR stating that the existence of state laws targeting ho-
mosexual conduct violated his right to private life.164 At that
time, the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 and the Crim-
inal Law Amendment Act of 1885 prohibited “buggery”165 and
“gross indecency”166 among males in both Northern Ireland and
Scotland167 respectively (in England and Wales, however, the
laws were not in force anymore).168 In 1981, after the application
was filed but prior to the ECtHR issuing a decision, Scotland
passed a law reform that, like the English and Welsh regimes,
decriminalized buggery and gross indecency.169 Therefore, at the
time the ECtHR delivered its judgment, the only British terri-
tory in which such provisions were in place was Northern Ire-
land. Some attempts in the late 1970s to remove homosexual
conduct among consenting adults from Northern Irish penal
laws were made170 but ultimately failed,171 as vast portions of
the Northern Irish society were of the opinion that sodomy had
163. Id. at 577.
164. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1981).
165. Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, §§ 61, 62
(UK) (repealed).
166. Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, § 11 (UK) (re-
pealed).
167. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
168. Id. at 5.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 7–10.
171. Id. at 8.
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to be prosecuted172 (despite the fact that no prosecution for ho-
mosexual offenses by private persons actually took place be-
tween 1972 and 1981).173
Mr. Dudgeon was initially investigated for drug offenses, not
homosexual conduct.174 While investigators searched his house,
they found papers and documents describing homosexual activ-
ities.175 The Director of Prosecution of Northern Ireland, how-
ever, decided not to prosecute him for the offense of gross inde-
cency between males.176Mr. Dudgeon applied before the ECtHR,
claiming that the mere existence of criminal laws against homo-
sexual conduct—and the subsequent police investigation—con-
stituted a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR for unjustified inter-
ference with his right to private life.177 Article 8 of the ECHR
states that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.” It permits
public authorities to interfere with the enjoyment of such right
only “in accordance with the law” and so long as such interfer-
ence is “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of na-
tional security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.”178
Explaining Mr. Dudgeon’s complaint in the ECtHR, the court
noted that the applicant complained that the then-existing laws
prohibiting homosexual conduct in Northern Ireland caused him
fear, suffering, and psychological distress.179 For instance, “fol-
lowing the search of his house, . . . he was questioned by the
police about certain homosexual activities and that personal pa-
pers belonging to him were seized. In his view, he had “suffered,
and continued to suffer, an unjustified interference with his
right to respect for his private life.”180
172. Id.
173. Id. at 10.
174. Id. at 11.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Mr. Dudgeon also complained that he suffered discrimination on
grounds of sex, sexuality, and residence within the meaning of Article 14 of the
ECHR; however, because the ECtHR found that Mr. Dudgeon’s rights were
violated under Article 8, it did not consider his complaints under Article 14. Id.
178. ECHR, supra note 17, art. 8.
179. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1981).
180. Id.
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The ECtHR endorsed Mr. Dudgeon’s claim, pointing out that
the very existence of legal provisions against homosexual con-
duct “constitute[d] a continuing interference with the applicant’s
right to respect for his private life.” Although those rules had not
been concretely enforced, they were still capable of triggering
prosecutions, as the police investigation against Dudgeon
demonstrated.181 Then, the ECtHR explored the justification for
such a penal sanction more in depth and adopted the following
line of reasoning:
[S]ome degree of regulation of male homosexual conduct, as in-
deed of other forms of sexual conduct, by means of the criminal
law can be justified as “necessary in a democratic society.” . . .
Furthermore, this necessity . . . may even extend to consensual
acts committed in private, notably where there is call . . . “to
provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corrup-
tion of others, particularly those who are specially vulnerable
because they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced,
or in a state of special physical, official or economic depend-
ence.” In practice there is legislation on the matter in all the
member States of the Council of Europe, but what distin-
guishes the law in Northern Ireland . . . is that it prohibits gen-
erally gross indecency between males and buggery whatever
the circumstances. . . . [T]he question in the present case is
whether the contested provisions . . . remain within the bounds
of what, in a democratic society, may be regarded as neces-
sary.182
According to the ECtHR’s reasoning, states are left with some
margin of appreciation to balance interests and find a normative
solution.183 Yet, this degree of latitude for states also varied in
light of the particularities of each country:
The fact that similar measures are not considered necessary in
other parts of the United Kingdom . . . does not mean that they
cannot be necessary in Northern Ireland. . . . [T]he moral cli-
mate in Northern Ireland in sexual matters . . . is one of the
matters which the national authorities may legitimately take
into account in exercising their discretion. There is . . . a strong
body of opposition stemming from a genuine and sincere con-
viction shared by a large number of responsible members of the
Northern Irish community that a change in the law would be
181. Id. at 14.
182. Id. at 16 (internal citations omitted).
183. Id. at 17 (internal citation omitted).
158 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
seriously damaging to the moral fabric of society. . . . [T]his
point of view . . . among an important sector of Northern Irish
society is certainly relevant.184
It was up to the ECtHR, however, to evaluate “whether the in-
terference [with private life] complained of was proportionate to
the social need claimed for it.”185 In the end, the ECtHR found
that Mr. Dudgeon’s right to private life was violated because “the
restriction imposed on [him], by reason of its breadth and abso-
lute character, [wa]s . . . disproportionate to the aims sought to
be achieved.”186 It must be added that the ECtHR found this
measure to be disproportionate because of the social and cultural
changes that were affecting European life: “[T]he Court cannot
overlook the marked changes which have occurred in this regard
in the domestic law of the member States . . . . In Northern Ire-
land itself, the authorities have refrained in recent years from
enforcing the law in respect of private homosexual acts.”187
Surely, both Dudgeon and Lawrence targeted laws that crimi-
nalized homosexual conduct and found them to be violations of
the right to privacy. Nevertheless, we can observe differences in
the reasoning between the two cases. Dudgeon treated laws tar-
geting sodomy as part and parcel of a package of measures that
legitimately aimed “to provide sufficient safeguards against ex-
ploitation and corruption of others.”188 According to Dudgeon,
limitations on homosexual conduct for moral reasons were legit-
imate;189 however, they could not involve penal sanctions,190
which the court found to be “disproportionate.”191 The legal
stigma attached to being homosexual could be justified in court’s
eyes, so long as penal sanctions were not involved.
Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence found a clear
violation of the right to privacy in the Texas law192 and overruled
Bowers because “[i]ts continuance as precedent demean[ed] the
184. Id. at 18 (internal citations omitted).
185. Id. at 19.
186. Id. at 20.
187. Id. at 19.
188. Id. at 37.
189. Sadurski, supra note 129, at 31.
190. See Glendon, supra note 23, at 10.
191. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1981).
192. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (“The petitioners are enti-
tled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence
or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
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lives of homosexual persons,” and imposed a “stigma” on them.193
There are striking differences between Dudgeon and Lawrence.
But, in Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court focused on the out-
come of Dudgeon and overlooked the legal reasoning behind it.
In doing so, it did not fully realize the differences between the
ECtHR’s approach to antihomosexuality laws and its own.
2. The ECtHR’s Case Law After Dudgeon
One of Justice Kennedy’s crucial points in Lawrence was that
Bowers was “not correct when it was decided”194 and caused “un-
certainty.”195 The unjustness of Bowers prevailed over the doc-
trine of stare decisis and prompted its overruling. Lawrence saw
Dudgeon through a common law lens, as if it established a good
precedent that the ECtHR followed consistently thereafter in
line with a sort of stare decisis doctrine.196 In Lawrence’s word-
ing, “[t]he [ECtHR] has followed not Bowers but its own decision
in Dudgeon. . . . See P. G. & J. H. [2001]; Modinos [1993]; Norris
[1988].”197
The issue, however, is more nuanced. Dudgeon was not uncon-
troversial. After all, it narrowed down the state’s discretion on a
topic that had been regarded as culturally sensitive.198 In fact,
the decision itself was not unanimous. Out of the seventeen
judges that compose the Great Chamber of the ECtHR, six
judges dissented and four dissenting opinions199 and one partial
dissent were filed.200
Several dissenters found that penal laws incriminating homo-
sexual conduct did not violate the ECHR generally.201 Others
found that there was no violation of Article 8 of the ECHR spe-
cifically because the applicant was not convicted or prosecuted
193. Id. at 575.
194. Id. at 578.
195. Id. at 577.
196. Id. at 576.
197. Id. at 576.
198. See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
MODERN L. REV. 1, 10 (1974).
199. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21–41 (1981)
(Zekia, J., dissenting) (Evrigenis & Garcia de Enterria, J.J., dissenting)
(Matscher, J., dissenting) (Pinheiro Farinha, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 34 (Walsh, J., partially dissenting).
201. Id. at 24, 34, 33 (Zekia, J., dissenting) (Walsh, J., dissenting) (Pinheiro
Farina, J., dissenting).
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under any of the relevant criminal laws; rather, he simply com-
plained that their very existence threatened his lifestyle and
subjected him to police investigation.202 Overall, four members
of the panel dissented on the grounds that there had been no
breach of Article 8 of the ECHR. A divided ECtHR judgment is
not necessarily a solid foundation that subsequent case law can
use to base its decisions. This is linked to two different factors:
namely, the special status of the ECtHR and the ECtHR’s self-
understanding.
The ECtHR’s backdrop is international law, which “knows no
stare decisis.”203 Theoretically, its decisions do not need to be con-
sistent over time.204 Stable precedents and explicit overrulings
are, however, crucial for global adjudicators at the highest level
of their respective domestic courts.205 Supreme Court precedents
orient lower courts and ground the societal expectation that the
whole judiciary will follow suit.206 But, the ECtHR is formally
neither a supreme nor a higher national court: it is a suprana-
tional court and its whole effectiveness stands on the shoulders
of the compliance of state members. 207
In the conceptual framework in which the ECtHR operates,
precedents are subject to change.208 Actually, they are not ex-
pected to stay too long, as they capture only a transitional stage
in the development of the ECHR’s case-law. It is not rare to find
in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence the affirmation that a topic of the
ECHR can “still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no
202. Id. at 28, 33 (Matscher, J., dissenting) (Pinheiro Farina, J., dissenting).
203. Ingo Venzke, The Role of International Courts as Interpreters and Devel-
opers of the Law: Working Out the Jurisgenerative Practice of Interpretation,
34 LOY. L.A. INT’L&COMP. L.REV. 99, 123 (2011); see alsoArmin von Bogdandy,
Common Principles for a Plurality of Orders: A Study on Public Authority in
the European Legal Area, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 980, 987 (2014).
204. Venzke, supra note 203, at 123.
205. See L. A. Powe, Jr., Intragenerational Constitutional Overruling, 89
NOTREDAME L. REV. 2093, 2099 (2014).
206. RUPERT CROSS & J. W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 7 (4th ed.
1991).
207. Janneke Gerards, The European Court of Human Rights and the Na-
tional Courts: Giving Shape to the Notion of ‘Shared Responsibility,’ in
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ONHUMAN RIGHTS AND OF THE
JUDGMENTS OF THE ECTHR INNATIONAL CASE-LAW 22 (Janneke Gerards & Jo-
seph Fleuren eds., 2014).
208. Dyson Heydon, Are Bills of Rights Necessary in Common Law Systems?,
130 LAWQ. REV. 392, 404 (2014).
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established consensus.”209 A precedent is thus only temporary in
the ECtHR.
This is because the ECtHR maintains an evolutionary inter-
pretation of the ECHR.210 It openly affirms that “[a] failure by
the Court to maintain a dynamic and evoluti[onary] approach
would risk rendering [the ECHR] a bar to reform or improve-
ment.”211 In other words, the ECtHR understands the ECHR as
a “living instrument,”212 in a nonoriginalist and nontextualist in-
tellectual framework,213 according to which the interpretation of
the text changes along with the people whose rights it is called
to protect. This idea of a “living instrument” is considered the
true “genius” of the ECHR,214 as the ECHR is continuously ad-
justed to fit within the contemporary context.215 Therefore, for
the U.S. Supreme Court, basing an argument on the mere fact
that the ECtHR issued a given decision is suspect because the
ECtHR’s holding is seemingly temporary.216 Additionally, judg-
ments written with numerous dissents warrant even more cau-
tion because it is less likely that later decisions will follow such
judgments.
A further distinction must be made at this point. The U.S. Su-
preme Court noted that Bowers “was not correct when it was de-
cided”217 and therefore overruled it. This understanding of over-
ruling as a means to correct previous erroneous judgments is,
209. Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, 438 (emphasis
added).
210. Alastair Mowbray, An Examination of the European Court of Human
Rights’ Approach to Overruling Its Previous Case Law, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 179,
198 (2009).
211. Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), App. No. 10249/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 104,
HUDOC (Sept. 17, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-
94135”]}.
212. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1978).
213. George Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Le-
gitimacy, in CONSTITUTINGEUROPE: THEEUROPEANCOURT OFHUMANRIGHTS IN
ANATIONAL, EUROPEANANDGLOBALCONTEXT (Andreas Follesdal, Birgit Peters,
& Geir Ulfstein eds., 2013).
214. Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court of Human Rights in Action, 21
RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 83, 84 (2004), http://www.asianlii.org/jp/jour-
nals/RitsLRev/2004/4.pdf.
215. Mowbray, supra note 210, at 198.
216. Paolo G. Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in Interna-
tional Human Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, 73 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1217, 1220 (1998).
217. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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after all, a feature of the stare decisis doctrine,218 as enshrined
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,219 which Lawrence correctly
quoted. But, this is not the type of approach that the ECtHR
would take. An incremental, evolutionary framework does not
care too much if overruled judgments were mistaken when they
were decided. Rather, it wonders whether they are correct today.
Another aspect that deserves close attention is the importance
that the U.S. Supreme Court attached to ECtHR case law de-
cided after Dudgeon. Justice Kennedy stressed the fact that
Dudgeonwas not a solitary decision in the vast context of ECtHR
case law. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court painted a picture in
whichDudgeon inaugurated a trend that P. G. & J. H.,Modinos,
and Norris followed.220 The reality, however, is rather distant
from Justice Kennedy’s account. Lawrence grouped together
cases that do not fit within its picture. For example, in relying
on P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom,221 the U.S. Supreme Court
was correct in assessing that this judgment found a breach of
Article 8 of the ECHR. But, the context of P.G. & J.H.was totally
different. The applicants in P.G. & J.H. were convicted of con-
spiracy to commit armed robbery.222 In their complaint, they ar-
gued that the means used to collect information against them
violated their rights under the ECHR.223 Specifically, the com-
plaint alleged that the police had recorded their conversations,
used the record in evidence at their trial, and had the judge hear
it absent the defense. The applicants “relied on Articles 6 [which
gives the right to a fair trial], 8 and 13 [which gives the right to
an effective remedy] of the Convention.”224 Besides the invoca-
tion of Article 8, the facts of P.G. & J.H. do not seem to suggest
a connection with Dudgeon.
The only connection with Dudgeon was found in dicta of the
decision, in which the ECtHR articulated the scope and meaning
of “private life” under Article 8. Drawing from its prior case law,
the ECtHR stated:
218. CROSS&HARRIS, supra note 206, at 131.
219. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
220. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
221. P. G. & J. H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195.
222. Id. at 203.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 203, ¶ 3.
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Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive defi-
nition. The Court has already held that elements such as gen-
der identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life
are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Ar-
ticle 8 (see, for example, B. v. France . . . Burghartz v. Switzer-
land . . . Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom . . . and Laskey, Jag-
gard and Brown v. the United Kingdom. . . . Article 8 also pro-
tects a right to identity and personal development, and the
right to establish and develop relationships with other human
beings and the outside world. . . .225
There are so many quotations in this excerpt of P.G. & J.H., and
the cited cases’ facts and holdings are so distinguishable from
Dudgeon that one has to look closely to find the reference to
Dudgeon to single it out from the rest of the cases.
On the other hand, Modinos v. Cyprus226 and Norris v. Ire-
land227 are quoted quite properly since they have many more
facts in common with Dudgeon (despite the fact that Norris was
decided five years before Modinos, so the line of ECtHR prece-
dent in the field is actually different from what one may believe
from reading Lawrence). The cases involved Cypriot228 and
Irish229 penal laws against homosexual relations respectively. In
Modinos, the relevant provision prohibited “carnal knowledge of
any person against the order of nature,” as well as sanctioned
those who permitted “a male person to have carnal knowledge of
him against the order of nature.”230 InNorris, the relevant pieces
of legislation targeting homosexual conduct were the same that
originated the Dudgeon controversy, which were still in force in
Ireland at the time of the case.231
In both cases, the ECtHR found that there had been a breach
of Article 8 of the ECHR. Yet, neither of the applicants in the
cases were prosecuted or even investigated for their homosexual
225. Id. at 217, ¶ 56.
226. Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
227. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
228. For sections 171, 172, and 173 of the Criminal Code of Cyprus, seeMod-
inos, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3, ¶ 8.
229. For more information regarding Irish laws against homosexuality, spe-
cifically sections 61 and 62 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and
section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, see Norris, 142 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 4–5, ¶ 12.
230. See Modinos, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3, ¶ 8.
231. Id.
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conduct.232 Instead, like in Dudgeon, the complainants in both
Modinos and Norris argued that the very existence of such laws
amounted to an interference with their private lives.233
Modinos was resolved quite succinctly and was delivered by a
Section of the Court, which, drew from bothDudgeon andNorris,
enabling the court to avoid going into greater detail with respect
to the case at hand.234 Norris, on the other hand, was heavily
critiqued in a plenary session of the ECtHR, with large quota-
tions taken from Dudgeon.235 Norris deserves greater atten-
tion—as it did when it was decided—because it emphasized that
the very fact that Ireland made “such acts criminal offences”236
was a disproportionate measure. It turned the ECtHR’s atten-
tion from the threat of actual prosecutions to the very existence
of antihomosexuality laws, which provided sufficient grounds for
a complaint.
This expansion of Dudgeon to encompass complaints about the
very existence of laws targeting sodomy did not go unnoticed.
More precisely, out of fourteen judges, six filed a joint dissenting
opinion, remarking that Norris bore
great similarities to the Dudgeon case. . . . However, an appre-
ciable and . . . decisive difference between the two cases [lay] in
the fact that, in the Dudgeon case, the applicant had been sub-
jected by the police to certain intrusions into his private life
whilst, in this case, no action was taken against the applicant
by the authorities.237
The dissent clearly perceived thatNorriswas expanding the pro-
tection accorded to homosexuals’ private life and not simply con-
firming it.
After this examination of the ECtHR cases cited in Lawrence,
it seems reasonable to conclude that Justice Kennedy did not
line up a series of cases that were unquestionably related to each
other. On the contrary, he gathered a series of cases that were
significantly different from each other and which prompted con-
siderable dissent. Interestingly enough, Justice Kennedy did not
232. See id. at 7, ¶ 17; Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4, ¶ 10(iii).
233. Modinos, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6–7, ¶ 16; Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3,
¶ 9.
234. Modinos, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8, ¶¶ 23–24.
235. See Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15–16, ¶ 46.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 20 (Valticos, J., joined by Gölcüklü, Matscher, Walsh, Bernhardt,
& Carrillo Salcedo, J.J., dissenting).
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give an adequate picture of Dudgeon and the cases that came
afterward. Had he done so, he could have used those cases in a
more focused and less controversial way. Lawrence’s majority
stressed that penal sanctions for homosexual conduct stigma-
tized homosexuals.238 It was in the context of that reasoning that
the U.S. Supreme Court could have referred to Dudgeon, and
more importantly to Norris, to underline precisely that the mere
existence of laws targeting homosexual conduct placed a stigma
upon them. But, Lawrence’s quotation of Dudgeon missed the
point. It exploited Dudgeon, in general terms, as an exemplar of
the global attitude toward antisodomy laws without any further
explanation. It failed to notice, however, that Dudgeon con-
firmed Lawrence’s idea that antisodomy laws imposed a stigma
on homosexuals.
3. The Authoritativeness of the ECtHR’s Case Law
The most problematic aspect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s reli-
ance on ECtHR case law of P.G. & J.H., Modinos, and Norris
was the authoritativeness given to these quotations by the court.
Justice Kennedy said that Dudgeon was “[a]uthoritative in all
countries that are members of the Council of Europe.”239 This
affirmation requires adequate consideration.
There is no doubt that the ECtHR’s decisions create an obliga-
tion upon the Member State that is found in violation of an Ar-
ticle of the ECHR. Article 46 of the ECHR states that Member
States “undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in
any case to which they are parties.”240 Accordingly, under Article
46, ECtHR decisions only bind the parties involved in that con-
troversy.241 The ECtHR does not prevail over domestic legisla-
tion or case law throughout all theMember States, meaning, “[i]f
a state refuses to accept a judgment handed down in a case to
which it was not a party, there are no means to force the state to
accept it.”242
Think about Dudgeon and Norris. Norris, which was decided
several years afterDudgeon, dealt with the very same provisions
that the Dudgeon court found to violate Article 8 of the ECHR.
238. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
239. Id. at 573.
240. ECHR, supra note 17, art. 46.
241. Gerards, supra note 207, at 21.
242. Id. at 22.
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Had Dudgeon been binding, that piece of legislation would have
never been brought to the attention of the ECtHR again. After
all, it is no surprise that Norris reaffirmed Dudgeon—as Ken-
nedy rightly points out—because both cases involved the very
same provisions.
Interestingly enough, the U.K. constitutional system differen-
tiates between the jurisprudence of the CJEU, which is “bind-
ing,”243 and the ECtHR, which merely is “influential.”244 This dis-
tinction can shed light on how “authoritative” ECtHR decisions
should have been for the U.S. Supreme Court. “Authoritative”
does not mean “binding.” It is certainly true that “important ar-
eas of [domestic] law . . . have changed as a result of the influence
of the ECHR and the case law of the [ECtHR]. National courts
frequently refer to the ECtHR’s case law.”245 But, changes in do-
mestic laws do not stem directly from the ECtHR’s decisions. On
the contrary, they are a function of several variables that have
more to do with the constitutional structure of the Member
States of the ECHR than with the force that ECtHR decisions
carry.246
Several states already ensure that new legislation must com-
ply with the ECHR and now align their own interpretation of the
ECHR with ECtHR decisions.247 For example, according to the
Italian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitution “requires
the exercise of the legislative power of the state and the regions
to comply with international law obligations, which undoubtedly
include the European Convention on Human Rights.”248 Mean-
ing, the ECtHR’s case law that targets other countries can bind
a state legislature and be utilized in the domestic judicial review
243. Lady Hale, Who Guards the Guards?, Closing Address to the London
Public Law Project Conference 2013 (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.publiclawpro-
ject.org.uk/data/resources/144/PLP_conference_Lady_Hale_address.pdf.
244. Id.
245. Janneke Gerards & Joseph Fleuren, Introduction, in IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF THE JUDGMENTS OF
THEECTHR INNATIONALCASE-LAW 1 (Janneke Gerards & Joseph Fleuren eds.,
2014).
246. COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 3 (2014).
247. Id. at 151.
248. Corte Costituzionale [Corte Cost.] [Constitutional Court], 24 ottobre
2007, n. 348, Giur. it. 2008, ¶ 4.2 (It.), http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/docu-
menti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S348_2007_Eng.pdf.
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of legislation.249 Even in such circumstances, however, the EC-
tHR has no means to enforce its judgments in those states.250
Notwithstanding its constitutional framework, Italy is said to
simply refuse “to comply with the vast majority of rulings
handed down by the Court.”251
State compliance with ECtHR rulings is therefore largely vol-
untary. In and of itself, ECtHR case law is not directly enforce-
able in any state party to the ECHR unless a state commits itself
to obeying the jurisprudence. And while many states fully com-
ply with the ECtHR’s rulings, some do not. What is most inter-
esting is that the United Kingdom, which shares the most com-
monalities with the United States jurisprudentially, has not pro-
vided the domestic judiciary with the capacity to amend U.K.
legislation to incorporate ECtHR case law. Enacting the Human
Rights Act in 1998 with the aim of ensuring compliance with
ECtHR rulings, the British Parliament252 followed its strong tra-
dition of granting parliamentary sovereignty253 and prevented
British judges from setting aside domestic law in order to enforce
ECtHR rulings. Moreover, further limiting ECtHR rulings is the
fact that the decisions only bind the state found in violation of
the contours of the court’s holding. Meaning, the state is ex-
pected to remedy only the violation and is not required to em-
brace the ECtHR’s reasoning.254 All things considered, the EC-
tHR’s authoritativeness is distinct from its binding force. That
said, many of the forty-seven domestic jurisdictions that have
adhered to the ECHR have increasingly incorporated its rulings
into their legal interpretation.255 But, incorporating ECtHR law
into the interpretation of domestic law is, above all, a matter of
political practicality.256 For example,
249. Id.
250. See HILLEBRECHT, supra note 246, at 36–37.
251. Id. at 121.
252. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 3 (UK).
253. Law, supra note 51, at 664.
254. Gerards, supra note 207, at 24, 25.
255. To large extent, even British courts are required to interpret the domes-
tic law in a manner that is compatible with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Roger
Masterman, The United Kingdom, in IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE ECTHR IN
NATIONAL CASE-LAW 307 (Janneke Gerards & Joseph Fleuren eds., 2014).
256. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 42, at 128.
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[t]he national courts [of the states that are party to the ECHR]
are asked to adopt the Court’s autonomous and evolutionary
definitions of Convention rights and apply them in their own
case law. If they do not do so, or lack the competence to set
aside national legislation, the state may be held accountable
for a violation of the ECHR.257
As a result, an ECHR violation does not bear domestic legal
effects by itself unless a state decides differently.
In 2010, the states formalized this progressive incorporation of
ECtHR case law at the High Level Conference on the Future of
the European Court of Human Rights,258 where they committed
themselves to “take into account” the holdings of the ECtHR in
the cases to which they are not a party “with a view to consider-
ing the conclusions to be drawn from a judgment finding a viola-
tion of the Convention by another State.”259 The necessity of
“taking into account” ECtHR case law regardless of which states
were involved in the litigation is the outcome of two different
factors: namely, the res interpretata expectation and the non-
binding nature of ECtHR case law itself.
Although the ECtHR does not utilize stare decisis,260 it is com-
monly understood that the ECtHR’s judgments have the force of
res interpretata.261 Each time the ECtHR is confronted with a
new case, it does not start from scratch in examining the ECHR.
On the contrary, it builds on preexisting decisions.262 This gives
the ECtHR’s decisions some level of predictability and incentiv-
izes the states to comply with ECtHR case law.
The states’ duty to “take into account” the ECtHR’s trends
simply confirms that its decisions are nonbinding. If the ECtHR
had a binding effect on state law, each state could not merely
“take into account” what the ECtHR decides but rather would
need to comply with its rulings. In reality, each state exercises
257. Gerards, supra note 207, at 71.
258. The document was later called the “Interlaken Declaration.” See Inter-
laken Declaration, COUNCIL EUR. (Feb. 2, 2010), https://wcd.coe.int/View-
Doc.jsp?id=1591969.
259. Id. § B(4)(c) (noting that states are called to take “into account the
Court’s developing case-law, also with a view to considering the conclusions to
be drawn from a judgment finding a violation of the Convention by another
State, where the same problem of principle exists within their own legal sys-
tem.”).
260. Venzke, supra note 203, at 123.
261. Gerards & Fleuren, supra note 245, at 2.
262. Gerards, supra note 207, at 23.
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full sovereignty, at least in the way it draws from and imple-
ments the ECtHR’s judgments.263 Again, the authoritativeness
of the ECtHR’s rulings has very few similarities with “binding
force” here. The very nature of the ECHR, its authority, and the
level of state compliance make it hard to maintain that “[t]o fol-
low the ECtHR is to follow the practice of not just one or two
countries, but forty-seven countries.”264
In a few words, the ECtHR’s decisions can be considered au-
thoritative only through a combination of the predictability of
the ECtHR’s case law over time—which pushes states parties to
conform to it—and the constitutional structure of each party to
the ECHR, since some states accord ECtHR rulings with binding
force while others do not. How such factors combine depends on
the state, on the decision, and on how well each decision fits
within the line of cases. Hence, the ECtHR’s authoritativeness
is a consequence of the reasonableness of its case law, the atti-
tude of each state towards the ECtHR’s case law itself, and the
compatibility of its case law with each state’s laws.265
Lawrence seems to have given only a superficial look at the
ECtHR’s case law and status and extracted the generic ideas
that it opposes antihomosexual conduct and that this opposition
applies to all the members of the Council of Europe. This account
is too generic and even misleading. A closer look at the cases
Lawrence quoted and the ECtHR’s status and case law as a
whole would have still had value for the decision but in a much
more nuanced way. It could have fed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
consideration that penal laws targeting sodomy may impose a
social stigma—but, Justice Kennedy’s opinion does not establish
any explicit connection between the issue of social stigma and
the ECtHR’s citations. Lawrence’s depiction of ECtHR case law
on the subject was incomplete and probably misleading. Conse-
quently, had the U.S. Supreme Court looked more thoroughly
into the details of the relevant cases, it could have found the case
law within its reasoning.
263. Id. at 19.
264. Law, supra note 2, at 1026 (internal citations omitted).
265. HILLEBRECHT, supra note 246, at 3.
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B. Printz v. United States
Printz v. United States266 is another interesting example of
how foreign sources can be utilized. Printz struck down a piece
of federal legislation that commanded state officials to conduct
background checks before authorizing the sale of guns.267 Ac-
cording to the court, the federal control of local authorities in-
fringed upon the “dual sovereignty”268 system envisioned by the
U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the federal government from
acting through the states.
The distinction in Printz is that foreign sources were quoted
only in a dissenting opinion. This case is particularly relevant
because it shows the importance of understanding the function-
ing of the foreign system where the source is drawn and heeds a
word of caution to judges to understand the foreign source’s im-
plications and presuppositions before using it. In other words,
the U.S. Supreme Court should reflect on whether the structure
and the dynamics of a foreign legal system are compatible with
the structure of the U.S. legal system. Learning how a foreign
country works, however, does not necessarily entail importing
its system into the legal system of another country, including the
United States.
Justice Breyer filed a powerful dissent in which he lamented
that federalism does not prevent the federal government from
requesting the performance of certain duties from state author-
ities. According to Justice Breyer:
[T]he United States is not the only nation that seeks to recon-
cile the practical need for a central authority with the demo-
cratic virtues of more local control. At least some other coun-
tries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local con-
trol is better maintained through application of a principle that
is the direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from
the silence of our Constitution. The federal systems of Switzer-
land, Germany, and the European Union . . . all provide that
constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves
implement many of the laws . . . enacted by the central “federal”
body. . . .
266. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
267. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993).
268. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
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Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not
those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and
structural differences between their systems and our own. . . .
But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light
on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem—in this case the problem of reconciling central au-
thority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing auton-
omy of a smaller constituent governmental entity. . . .
As comparative experience suggests, there is no need to in-
terpret the Constitution as containing an absolute principle—
forbidding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to any
state official.269
The crucial passage states that “[t]he federal system[] of . . .
the [European Union] provide[s] that constituent states, not fed-
eral bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws
. . . enacted by the central ‘federal’ body.”270 Justice Breyer was
aware that he was not expected to interpret the constitutions of
other nations.271 But, he highlighted that “their experience may
nonetheless cast an empirical light” on the relationship between
the federation and the states.272 Among the examples he men-
tioned, the EUmodel may be themost misleading, unless Justice
Breyer is willing to make the bold affirmation that the U.S. con-
ception of federalism should align itself to the EU model or that
it would be possible to draw from one feature of EU constitution-
alism while leaving out the rest.
The debate around the quasi-national, federal, or interna-
tional nature of the European Union is still ongoing.273 Further,
at the time Printz was penned, it was even more debated.274 Af-
ter all, the Lisbon Treaty, which gave a firmer and more coher-
ent structure to the European Union,275 had not yet been imple-
269. Id. at 976–77.
270. Id. at 976.
271. Id. at 977.
272. Id.
273. See generally PAUL CRAIG&GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW (2011).
274. For more information on the debate, see SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION
(Neil Walker ed., 2003).
275. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
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mented, and the EU constitutional structure was relatively un-
developed and in need of maintenance.276 But, the real problem
with Justice Breyer’s reasoning lies in the dynamics of the EU
model itself.
Professor Joseph Weiler, one of the most important commen-
tators in the field, stresses that the EU constitutional identity is
marked by a Sonderweg, meaning a “special way” in German.277
As Weiler depicted it, the EU model is “a constitution without
some of the classic conditions of constitutionalism. . . . Indeed,
European federalism is constructed with a top-to-bottom hierar-
chy of norms, but with a bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority
and real power.”278
Among the tools that most characterize this combination of a
law looking downward and institutions looking upward are the
preliminary ruling procedure and the doctrine of “direct ef-
fect.”279 These long-standing tools have marked the implementa-
tion of EU law since the inception of the European Communities
and have channeled the Europeanization of states through a ju-
dicially driven process.280
The preliminary ruling procedure281 states that, if a domestic
judge finds what seems to be a conflict between EU law (and the
European Communities law before the European Union came
into existence) and domestic law, he or she must refer the issue
to the CJEU to solve the dilemma through an interpretation of
EU law.282 The preliminary ruling procedure introduced the “di-
rect effect” doctrine through the 1963 case Algemene Trans-
porten Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse
276. See State of the Union 2015, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/prior-
ities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
277. Joseph H. H. Weiler, In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitu-
tional Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISMBEYOND THE STATE 10 (Jo-
seph H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
278. Id. at 9.
279. ELINA PAUNIO, LEGAL CERTAINTY INMULTILINGUAL EU LAW: LANGUAGE,
DISCOURSE AND REASONING AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 59 (2013).
280. Joseph H. H. Weiler & Van Gend en Loos, The Individual as Subject and
Object and the Dilemma of European Legitimacy, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 94, 104
(2014).
281. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 177, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (now TFEU art. 208) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
282. Id.
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Administratie der Belastingen.283 In that case, a national judge
asked the then-ECJ (later CJEU) to interpret the effects of the
provisions of the European Economic Community Treaty. The
European Economic Community Treaty, which would later grow
and expand together with other treaties into the European Un-
ion, was established in the 1950s to promote a common market
and the “harmonious development of economic activities” among
its state members.284 The court had to decide whether the treaty
provisions had “direct application in national law in the sense
that nationals of member States may on the basis of [such Arti-
cles] claim to rights which the national Court must protect.”285
The judge not only ruled in the affirmative but also boldly af-
firmed that European Economic Community law—and later EU
law—was good law in each state and must be enforced by domes-
tic tribunals. In the judge’s words, the community constituted “a
new legal order of international law” that not only imposed “ob-
ligations on individuals but was “also intended to confer upon
them rights which become part of their legal heritage.”286 As a
result, “the implementation of [the Article of the treaty under
consideration did] not require any legislative intervention on the
part of the states,”287 and “according to the spirit, the general
scheme and the wording of the treaty, [the Article of the treaty
had to] be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating
individual rights” that national courts could enforce immedi-
ately.288 The preliminary ruling procedure289 and direct effect
doctrine have paved the way for the theory of the legal suprem-
acy of the European Economic Community and the European
Union.290 These doctrines have “internalized”291 state compli-
ance with EU law. The practical result is that domestic courts
act as EU courts when they have to deal with EU law, thus set-
283. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van
Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
284. CRAIG&BURCA, supra note 273, at 6.
285. Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. at 11.
286. Id. at 12.
287. Id. at 13.
288. Id.
289. JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, DECIPHERING THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL DNA OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: ANEXPLORATORYESSAY, PHILOSOPHICALFOUNDATIONS
OF EU LAW 150, 154 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012).
290. Weiler & Loos, supra note 280, at 102.
291. WEILER, supra note 289, at 154.
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ting precedent through legal opinion because all state institu-
tions are required to respect, enforce, and comply with EU law
as part of their law.292
When it comes to EU law, the practical wisdom Justice Breyer
probably sought in his dissent in Printz was part and parcel of a
legal order that internalized the federal model at the state level
in a way that sees domestic courts and institutions operating
under EU control. Justice Scalia, who penned the majority opin-
ion for the court, famously criticized Justice Breyer’s reference
to foreign legal expertise in rather drastic terms, writing:
Justice Breyer’s dissent would have us consider . . . other coun-
tries, and the [European Union]. We think such comparative
analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitu-
tion, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writ-
ing one. . . . The fact is that our federalism is not Europe’s.293
Justice Scalia could have gone another way, highlighting that
EU and U.S. federalism rest on largely different grounds, and,
therefore, the EU paradigm Justice Breyer was proposing did
not fit well in explaining how the U.S. Supreme Court should
have ruled. He could have brought Justice Breyer’s pragmatic294
justification of the piece of legislation to its logical end through
the EU example: if the law under the court’s scrutiny was com-
patible with EU dynamics, this very fact was, in and of itself, a
reason to doubt that the law was compatible with the U.S. Con-
stitution. Justice Breyer’s lesson about the European Union was
correct; and, since it was correct, it should have prompted him
to explain how the EU’s functioning could go along with the
structure of U.S. federalism.
C. The Death Penalty Cases
The issue of quoting or finding inspiration from foreign sources
also has marked the long-lasting debate about the permissibility
of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, which forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.”295
292. Julie Dickson, Towards a Theory of European Union Legal Systems, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN LAW 43–44 (2012).
293. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997).
294. Berger, supra note 39, at 707; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of
Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51
DUKE L.J. 223, 272 (2001).
295. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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Interestingly, a significant line of U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sions have made some references to European legal regimes in
support of their opinions.
As this section will show, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to
have taken isolated fragments of the European legal attitude to-
ward the death penalty, as it focused on the fact that this type
of punishment has virtually vanished in Europe while overlook-
ing how this phenomenon has unfolded. Had the U.S. Supreme
Court looked into its details, it could have learned much more.
As a result, the very same mistake that the U.S. Supreme Court
made in Lawrence is even more apparent with respect to death
penalty cases.
The practice of looking abroad in the context of the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution started with Trop v. Dul-
les,296 which struck down the penal sanctions for army desertion
on the basis of the Eighth Amendment. This judgment paid spe-
cial attention to foreign perspectives about the prohibition of
“cruel and unusual punishments.”297 Although Trop was not a
death penalty case, the case law that followed on the matter re-
lied on Trop and consequently considered the global attitude to-
ward capital punishment in its reasoning. Trop also has the rec-
ord of being “the first instance . . . in which the Court turned to
foreign sources of law in the course of a decision that struck
down, rather than upheld, an existing statute.”298
Roughly two decades after Trop, the U.S. Supreme Court
started looking into foreign approaches to the death penalty. In
Coker v. Georgia,299 the court addressed the issue of whether the
death penalty should be administered to a convicted rapist. In
its opinion, the court stated that “Trop v. Dulles . . . took pains
296. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103–04, 125–27 (1958).
297. Id. at 103–04 (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanim-
ity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. It is true
that several countries prescribe expatriation in the event that their nationals
engage in conduct in derogation of native allegiance. Even statutes of this sort
are generally applicable primarily to naturalized citizens. But use of denation-
alization as punishment for crime is an entirely different matter. The United
Nations’ survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that
only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a
penalty for desertion. In this country, the Eighth Amendment forbids this to
be done.” (internal citations omitted)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
298. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 20, at 892.
299. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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to note the climate of international opinion” it was “not irrele-
vant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in
1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape.”300 Since then,
the court has repeatedly pondered if its precedents on the legit-
imacy of capital punishment also resist the changing “interna-
tional opinion.”
The first time in which the court made explicit reference to the
European pattern in the context of death penalty cases was
Enmund v. Florida.301 In Enmund, the petitioner was convicted
of first-degree murder and robbery and sentenced to death, de-
spite neither taking part in the killings nor intending that they
take place at the time the robbery was conceived.302 The court
opined that the punishment was disproportionate,303 as it sanc-
tioned with death the mere participation in a robbery.304 In a
footnote, the opinion also considered international trends: “[The]
climate of international opinion . . . is an additional considera-
tion which is ‘not irrelevant.’ . . . It is thus . . . worth noting that
the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and
. . . is unknown in continental Europe.”305 In the eyes of the U.S.
Supreme Court, punishing this type of crime with a death sen-
tence made the United States an outlier within the Western
world, which, in turn, went against the preservation of the pen-
alty itself.
Building upon prior case law that looked to international
sources when writing its opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Oklahoma306 addressed whether the death penalty
should be administered to juveniles under the age of sixteen. The
court noted the following in its decision:
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of de-
cency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have
been expressed . . . by the leading members of the Western Eu-
ropean community. . . . Although the death penalty has not
been entirely abolished in the United Kingdom, . . . [t]he death
300. Id. at 597.
301. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
302. Id. at 789.
303. Id. at 798–96.
304. Id. at 801.
305. Id. at 797.
306. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portu-
gal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries,
and is available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in
. . . Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also
prohibited in the Soviet Union.307
The expression “Western European community,” seems to
mean the countries that, after World War II, developed special
connections with the United States and, therefore, could be said
to entertain political and cultural dialogues with it (however, the
court did not overlook the Soviet Union, i.e., the biggest and
most powerful Eastern European country). Overall, the U.S. Su-
preme Court kept looking toward Europe for inspiration and as
a useful comparison on whether the death penalty should still
have been considered a permissible punishment within the U.S.
Constitution. Fourteen years later in Atkins v. Virginia,308 the
court concluded that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execu-
tion of criminals with cognitive disabilities.309 The court also
made minor references to international trends regarding capital
punishment,310 including an interesting quotation in a footnote
from an abolitionist brief that had been filed before the Euro-
pean Union in a previous case: “[W]ithin the world community,
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”311
In the text of its opinion, the majority drew from this brief,
blending it with statistics about the national sentiments and
state initiatives against the death penalty to conclude that “a
national consensus [had] developed against it.”312 Albeit con-
fined to few words, the footnote reference to foreign sources was
not insubstantial, as it affected the overall consideration that
the practice had become “truly unusual.”313
The line of reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Atkins
found opposition among the dissenters. Chief Justice Rehnquist
highlighted that “the viewpoints of other countries simply are
307. Id. at 830–31.
308. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
309. Id. at 316 n.21 (citing “Brief for the European Union as Amicus Curiae
in McCarver v. North Carolina, O. T. 2001, No. 00–8727, p. 4.”).
310. Id. at 316–17.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 317.
313. Id.
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not relevant.”314 Similarly, Justice Scalia wrote: “[I]rrelevant are
the practices of the ‘world community.’”315
Adding even more controversy with respect to the use of for-
eign sources in U.S. Supreme Court decisions316 was Roper v.
Simmons.317 The issue under scrutiny in Roper was whether ap-
plying the death penalty to offenders under eighteen years old
was constitutional318 in light of Thompson, which outlawed the
death penalty for juveniles under the age of sixteen.319 The court
answered in the negative, finding confirmation in a broad con-
sideration of foreign sources.320 It considered “the stark reality
[that] the United States [was] the only country in the world that
continue[d] to give official sanction to the juvenile death pen-
alty.”321 Although “[t]his reality [did] not become controlling . . .
from the time of the Court’s decision in Trop, the Court [has
found that] the laws of other countries and . . . international au-
thorities [were] instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punish-
ments.’”322 Then it made explicit reference to an amici brief filed
by the European Union that provided evidence to the court that
“Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, which every country in the world has ratified save for
the United States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition
on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under
[the age of] 18.”323
Justice Scalia opposed the utilization of foreign sources in
vivid terms. In his words, the resort to alien law was both erro-
314. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. Between the Atkins and Roper decisions was Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S.
990 (2002), which denied certiorari to a petitioner requesting not to be executed
after decades of proceedings. Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer quoted several
foreign decisions, among which was the ECtHR’s Soering v. United Kingdom,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). See Foster, 537 U.S. at 993. Here, Foster is
not considered, as it does not deal with the issue of capital punishment itself
but rather the death penalty in the context of lengthy proceedings.
317. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
318. Id. at 564.
319. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 839 (1988).
320. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 576.
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neous, insofar as it subjected the interpretation of the U.S. Con-
stitution to foreign influence,324 and was biased by selectiveness,
as the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to rely on foreign sources
on other occasions when it could have taken inspiration from
abroad.325 In Justice Scalia’s view, “the basic premise of the
Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the
laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.
In fact the Court itself [did] not believe it. In many significant
respects the laws of most other countries differ from [U.S.] law”
including “many interpretations of the Constitution prescribed
by [the] Court itself.”326
Justice Scalia elaborated further, enumerating a series of
cases in which the court was perfectly aware that it was taking
a rather solitary path.327 The core of Justice Scalia’s response,
however, lay in defense of an originalist interpretation of the
constitution,328 which interprets the text according to its mean-
ing at the time it was enacted. In his words, the court, which had
“long rejected a purely originalist approach to [the] Eighth
Amendment,”329 was at a crossroads. It could either “profess its
willingness to reconsider [the topics covered by the Eighth
Amendment] in light of the views of foreigners, or . . . cease put-
ting forth foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its
decisions.”330 Justice Scalia advocated for the return to the plain
meaning of the constitutional text as opposed to the meaning
that the court was ascribing to it in light of foreign law and legal
opinions.
It is no surprise that the U.S. Supreme Court found support
for its move away331 from the death penalty through the Euro-
pean legal landscape. It is indisputable that “Europeans have
324. Id. at 622–23.
325. Id. at 623.
326. Id. at 624.
327. Id. at 625–26.
328. Id. at 625.
329. Id. at 627.
330. Id.
331. More recent decisions concerning the death penalty have also drawn
from foreign and international law, although they fail to quote European law
sources. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); McDonald v. Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010).
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taken issue with the notion that death can ever be an appropri-
ate sentence,”332 and that “the European human rights machin-
ery and the [European Union] have indicated their disagreement
and disenchantment with the United States over the issue of the
death penalty.”333 In the aftermath of World War II, many Euro-
pean countries started developing an abolitionist trend that con-
solidated between the 1950s and the 1970s334 and finally took
over the whole of Europe at the turn of the century.335
The abolition of the death penalty took place slowly and piece-
meal, however. It was not a topic on which European states
agreed in the immediate aftermath of World War II. The ECHR
did not prohibit the death penalty in 1953, when it entered into
force.336 It was only later on that its Protocols developed an abo-
litionist trend. For example, the Sixth Protocol,337which passed
in 1983, stated that “[t]he death penalty shall be abolished.”338
Nonetheless, the Sixth Protocol carved out a minor exception for
times of war, during which states could make provisions “for the
death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of
imminent threat of war.”339
Unlike the Sixth Protocol, the Thirteenth Protocol,340 which
passed in 2002, spoke the final word on this matter, restating
332. Nora V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States: Following
the European Lead, 81 OR. L. REV. 131, 131 (2002).
333. Id. at 132.
334. Id. at 134.
335. Id. The only exception was Latvia, which abolished the death penalty
for ordinary crimes in 1999 but retained it for military crimes until 2012. See
Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENT.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last
visited Nov. 11, 2016).
336. ECHR, supra note 17.
337. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr.
28, 1983, E.T.S. No. 114.
338. Id. art. 1.
339. Id. art. 2.
340. Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in
All Circumstances, May 4, 2002, E.T.S. No. 187.
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that “[t]he death penalty shall be abolished”341 without excep-
tion.342 Among the states that are party to the ECHR, only Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, and Russia did not ratify the Thirteenth Pro-
tocol.343 It is safe to say then that the overwhelming majority of
the Council of Europe’s members now understand the death pen-
alty as an impermissible means of punishment.
The European Union is not absent from this abolitionist sce-
nario. It arose from the ashes of World War II with a vision of a
pacified Europe but not necessarily with a particular focus on
the death penalty. Later on, the European Union started devel-
oping a language of and an interest in human rights as a tool to
self-legitimize344 and expand its reach.345 This development bol-
stered346 the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
(“EU Charter”),347 which is now part of EU law as a result of its
incorporation in the Lisbon Treaty.348 Article 2 of the EU Char-
ter clearly states that “[n]o one shall be condemned to the death
penalty.”349 Article 2 thus provides that a state cannot be consid-
ered for EU membership unless it abolishes capital punishment.
But, EU involvement in this scenario extends beyond the in-
ternal enforcement of rules against capital punishment. In fact,
341. Id. art. 1.
342. Id. art. 2 (“No derogation from the provisions of this Protocol shall be
made.”).
343. For a complete list of signature and ratifications, seeChart of Signatures
and Ratififications of Treaty 187, COUNCIL EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/187/signatures?p_auth=K1MdscYM (last visited Jan. 14,
2017).
344. This also includes the EU’s accession to the ECHR. See Jan Klabbers,
On Myths and Miracles: The EU and Its Possible Accession to the ECHR, 2013
HUNGARIAN Y.B. INT’L&EUR. L. 45, 58.
345. WEILER, supra note 289, at 157–58.
346. Filippo Fontanelli, The Implementation of European Union Law by
Member States Under Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 20
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 193, 200 (2014).
347. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. 391 (C 326) [hereinafter Charter of Rights].
348. The Treaty of Lisbon came into force on December 1, 2009. See Treaty
of Lisbon.
349. Charter of Rights, supra note 347, art. 2.
182 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
the European Union has become a proud player in the abolition-
ist movement.350 The European Union’s activism includes filing
briefs before U.S. courts,351 diplomatic pressure, and global dis-
semination of information about death penalty enforcement.352
At first glance, it is apparent that the U.S. Supreme Court uti-
lized foreign citations in an effort to evolve its jurisprudence on
the death penalty. Citations have grown in size and importance
and on pace with the progressive abolition of the death penalty,
moving from footnotes to central aspects of the text.353 Of course,
these parallel trends of death penalty abolition and growing for-
eign source quotations may legitimately prompt skepticism
among the dissenters because foreign sources seem to back the
court’s predetermined abolitionist orientation.
Another striking feature of U.S. case law on the death penalty
is the multilayered recourse to foreign citations from European
law. Despite being incomplete, the U.S. Supreme Court’s cita-
tions follow the changes in European legal culture on the death
penalty quite closely, and yet miss some crucial aspects of the
European developments in the field. Coker354made a generic ref-
erence to “major nations.”355 Enmund356 mentioned the disap-
pearance of the death penalty in “continental Europe.”357
Thompson358 enlarged the scope of its analysis to encompass the
“Western European community”359 and paralleled the broaden-
ing horizon of abolitionist countries, but it failed to quote the
350. Council Common Guidelines on Death Penalty (EU) No. 8416/13 Annex
of 12 Apr. 2013, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/guidelines_death_pen-
alty_st08416_en.pdf.
351. See, e.g., Brief for the European Union Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727) [here-
inafter Brief for the EU].
352. Demleitner, supra note 332, at 140.
353. Mary Ann Glendon notes that Roper gave “foreign material a controlling
role in the decision of an American constitutional question.” Glendon, supra
note 23, at 7; see also Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, The Separate
but Unequal Constitution, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 113, 159 (2014) (describing this
growth in usage).
354. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
355. Id.
356. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
357. Id. at 797. The disappearance of the death penalty in Europe was broad-
ening; but, the U.S. Supreme Court could not have quoted the Sixth Protocol
of the ECHR, which was not in existence at the time.
358. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
359. Id. at 830–31.
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Sixth Protocol that was already in place. Atkins360 and Roper361
quoted EU Briefs after the European Union symbolically out-
lawed the death penalty in the EU Charter.
This progressive quoting of European law hides the most prob-
lematic issue: if the U.S. Supreme Court wants to tackle the is-
sue of the death penalty as it has been addressed in Europe,
down the road, the court will need to reflect on the legitimacy of
the death penalty altogether. In fact, EU law, the ECHR, and
the law of the vast majority of European states say—with one
voice—that the death penalty can never be a just punishment.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s judgments simply abolished the death
penalty provisions that were presented before them, but, ulti-
mately, the European legal culture would like to convince the
United States to abolish capital punishment altogether. In the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Glossip v. Gross,362 Justice
Breyer’s dissent envisioned this moment, stating: “I believe it
highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. At the very least, the Court should call for full briefing on
the basic question.”363 Ultimately, the European cultural pres-
sure is unlikely to stop until the U.S. Supreme Court makes a
final decision on whether the death penalty can ever be legiti-
mate.
This European pressure gets lost in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
reasoning because each decision leaves the reasons for European
abolitionism of the death penalty unexplored. This turns argu-
ments opposing capital punishment generally into arguments
against specific death penalty laws in special circumstances364
or as applied to specific categories of people.365 The European at-
titude against capital punishment is generic enough to be played
out in different contexts but leaves the big question on the legit-
imacy of the death penalty in the dark. Readers of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decisions are left with the impression that the
court understands that the U.S. tradition of the death penalty
360. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002).
361. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
362. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2776–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
363. Id.
364. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977).
365. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
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has become an anomaly,366 but they have not offered any descrip-
tion of the rift that now divides the United States from Europe
in this field.367
What the court also fails to consider explicitly are the drivers
of abolitionism in Europe. The relevant ECHR Protocols, as well
as Article 2 of the EU Charter, came after state abolitionism.
The rising wave that has outlawed the death penalty started
fromwithin each state. It was only later, when the states already
set aside death penalty one by one, that the states brought the
issue to the supranational courts.
Moreover, in several states, de facto abolitionist trends started
first after domestic courts stopped enforcing the death pen-
alty,368 while de jure abolition followed thereafter.369 On the con-
trary, the U.S. Supreme Court is still concretely confronted with
state courts condemning an individual to death. There is a sen-
sible difference between abolishing the death penalty because it
is not being enforced and abolishing it so it cannot be enforced
anymore.
Finally, when European states abolished the death penalty,
they did so as states. This decision was largely deferred to the
legislature, the constitution, or constitutional amendment.
Many European states’ constitutions have provisions banning
the death penalty, including Italy,370 Germany,371 Sweden,372
Portugal,373 and Spain.374 Countries such as France,375Greece,376
and Ireland,377 however, outlawed capital punishment through
366. Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81
OR. L. REV. 97, 130 (2002).
367. Demleitner, supra note 332, at 159.
368. Id. at 133.
369. Id.
370. Art. 27 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
371. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]
[GG] [BASIC LAW], Dec. 23, 2014, art. 102 (Ger.), translation at http://www.ge-
setze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0569.
372. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2:4 (Swed.).
373. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1976,
art. 24, para 2. (Port.).
374. CONSTITUCIÓNESPAÑOLA [C.E.], Dec. 29, 1978, art. 15 (Spain).
375. 1958 LA CONSTITUTION [CONST.] art. 66-1 (Fr.).
376. Through its Criminal Code in 1983. See Stefano Manacorda, Restraints
on Death Penalty in Europe: A Circular Process, 1 J. INT’LCRIM. JUST. 263, 270
(2003).
377. First in its 1990 Criminal Code, then in a 2001 Constitutional amend-
ment. Id.
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parliamentary legislation. Since 1993, applicant states to the
Council of Europe must undertake to sign and ratify the ECHR
and its Protocols, so all post-Thirteenth Protocol candidates
have no choice but to abolish the death penalty.378 In fact, central
and eastern European countries have joined the abolitionist re-
gimes under the pressure of the Council of Europe,379 mainly
through amending their penal laws or constitutions.380 Only a
handful of countries have become abolitionist through a Consti-
tutional Court decision (Albania, Hungary, and Lithuania).381
Overall, the judicial outlawing of the death penalty is more the
exception than the norm in this increasingly abolitionist wave.382
The ECtHR, which deliberately embraces the “living instru-
ment” doctrine383 and draws from states’ cultures in its reason-
ing, treats the death penalty as an issue that is left to political
branches.384 When Turkey condemned to death the leader of the
PKK Kurdish party, “Ocalan,”385 the ECtHR noted: “By opening
for signature Protocol No. 13 . . . the Contracting States have
chosen the traditional method of amendment of the text of the
Convention in pursuit of their policy of abolition.”386
All things considered, the aspects that the U.S. Supreme Court
seemed to have overlooked with respect to utilizing foreign
sources are 1) that this is a particularly ethically sensitive terri-
tory, and states have retained much leeway in when and how to
abolish the death penalty; 2) that many states have seen the
death penalty fall into desuetude before outlawing it; and 3) that
setting aside this type of punishment has been a hallmark of
parliaments, not courts.
The scattered quotations to European legal culture have not
helped the U.S. Supreme Court spot these aspects. The Euro-
pean experience could have shed light on how delicate this issue
is and suggested some way to deal with it. This does not mean
that the U.S. Supreme Court should have followed the European
378. Roger Hood, Introduction –The Importance of Abolishing the Death Pen-
alty, in THEDEATH PENALTY: BEYOND ABOLITION 16 (2004).
379. Agata Fijalkowski, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Central and
Eastern Europe, 9 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV. 62, 78 (2001).
380. Id. at 63.
381. Id. at 75.
382. Hood, supra note 378, at 20–22.
383. Wildhaber, supra note 214, at 84.
384. See Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 47, 186, ¶ 164.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 186, ¶ 164.
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path; rather, it at least could have considered the European ap-
proach as an interesting pattern.
Analogously, Justice Scalia, who dissented in Roper on the
grounds that the court was entertaining foreign law,387 could
have been boosted by a deeper consideration of the European
legacy: that abolitionism does not happen at the expense of state
sovereignty or popular sensitivities. A deeper look at the Euro-
pean experience with the death penalty could have suggested
that, in Europe, the death penalty also was, first and foremost,
a political and state affair.
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court could have been misled by
the European Union’s intervention. The European Union advo-
cated the death penalty’s abolition before U.S. courts through
amicus briefs.388 This could be interpreted as an indicium that
in Europe the courts have played the biggest part in outlawing
such punishment. This, however, is untrue. The European Un-
ion may have put pressure on the U.S. Supreme Court because
it is more efficient to have death penalty provisions struck down
by the U.S. Supreme Court than it is to work and wait for each
state to make this decision. It is also no surprise that the Euro-
pean Union advocated the ban of the death penalty before the
U.S. Supreme Court. The EU legal environment is familiar with
judicial activism,389 as we have already noted that the combina-
tion of the CJEU and domestic courts was the main driver for
European integration.390 Both factors, however, cannot hide the
fact that the European legal culture has virtually wiped the
death penalty out of the continent state-by-state, mainly
through changes in legislation or in their respective constitu-
tions. The U.S. Supreme Court excerpted fragments of foreign
law and trends that testified the abolitionist wave in Europe; it
failed to address, however, some features of it that could have
shed light on some controversial aspects it was called upon to
judge.
387. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005).
388. See, e.g., Brief for the EU, supra note 351.
389. PAUNIO, supra note 279, at 58; see also Slaughter, supra note 36, at 1105.
390. Mark Dawson, The Political Face of Judicial Activism: Europe’s Law-
Politics Imbalance, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
19 (Mark Dawson et al. eds., 2013) (internal quotations omitted).
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III. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS: THEU.S. UNDERSTANDING OF
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The parade of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court utilized
European jurisprudence casts doubt on the feasibility of citing
European sources. The problem, however, does not lie in the
practice itself but rather in the methodology and the expecta-
tions that are normally attached to this practice.
The average debate about the legitimate importation of foreign
law into the U.S. Supreme Court’s adjudication normally sees
two conflicting opinions. In the liberal camp are the concerns of
staying on track with the development of transnational legal,
economic, and popular movements that fluctuate among juris-
dictions,391 learning from other experiences, and ultimately look-
ing for the best legal solution to a legal problem.392 These con-
cerns should prompt U.S. Supreme Court justices to engage in
comparative law.393
In the conservative camp are the concerns of selectiveness,394
decontextualization,395 and the lack of a democratic founda-
tion.396 After all, foreign quotations would disconnect fragments
of foreign law from their sources and attach them to an alien
constitutional structure. This operation would downplay the im-
portance of the opinions of the U.S. people because they blend
with others from jurisdictions that are foreign to the United
States.
It is safe to say that the U.S. Supreme Court’s practice in this
field confirms some reservations of using foreign law. Law-
rence397 clearly misunderstood Dudgeon398 and cobbled together
a heterogeneous line of cases under the misleading assumption
that ECtHR case law is “authoritative.”399 Justice Breyer’s dis-
sent in Printz400 looked at the European Union as an interesting
example of how states’ autonomy and the need for suprastate
391. Stephen Breyer Interview, supra note 79.
392. Mathias M. Siems, Bringing in Foreign Ideas: The Quest for ‘Better Law’
in Implicit Comparative Law, 9 J. COMP. L. 119, 119 (2014).
393. BREYER, supra note 3, at 426.
394. Gelter & Siems, supra note 37, at 40.
395. Kahn-Freund, supra note 198.
396. Jackson, supra note 157.
397. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
398. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
399. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
400. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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coordination can be reconciled; yet, he failed to mention that this
type of constitutional structure is precisely the European “spe-
cial way.”401 Further, the line of cases about capital punishment
drew from the unequivocal European abolitionist attitude; but,
the U.S. Supreme Court forgot to add that 1) de facto abolition
came first, which made it easier for states to outlaw the death
penalty; 2) the abolitionist wave took hold state-by-state through
a bottom-up process; and 3) the abolitionist movement spread
through legislatures rather than constitutional or supreme court
rulings that outlawed this kind of punishment.
In each of these scenarios, the U.S. Supreme Court missed cru-
cial points in its analysis that could have better shed light on
both the case at stake and the teachings that European legal
culture could impart. The U.S. Supreme Court’s flaws in inter-
preting European law, however, did not necessarily run against
the court considering European law in and of itself. Understand-
ing how European systems work and whether they are instruc-
tive for U.S. legal reasoning is not, by itself, selective or biased.
Nor does it necessarily take U.S. law out of U.S. hands. Once the
court understands what the European law says on a particular
issue, it is totally up to the court to decide what to do with it.
Conversely, if sources are used to back decisions, there is no
way to avoid the selectiveness conundrum, even if one decides to
confine the legal exploration to the European environment. Eu-
ropean law is multilayered with state and supranational re-
gimes blending hard law, soft law, and political pressure in a
way that makes it highly unlikely that Europe speaks with one
single voice, at one time, and for all.
European Union law is valid law in all European states thanks
to the supremacy and the “direct effect” doctrines that make
them “binding.”402 The ECHR’s status in each European state
varies with its constitutional infrastructure.403 Therefore, EC-
tHR case law is “influential”404 but not necessarily the law of the
land in every European state. The European legal culture varies
in multiple respects, as the region encompasses both civil and
401. Weiler, supra note 277, at 10.
402. See supra Part II.B.
403. Gerards, supra note 207, at 22.
404. Hale, supra note 243.
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common law countries and states that lack judicial review of leg-
islation and those that have it.405 Also, domestic courts have very
different attitudes, with common law courts unwilling to take an
activist approach,406 while the constitutional courts of central
and eastern Europe being more inclined to legislate from the
bench.407 The ECtHR and EU law are ultimately the umbrellas
for different traditions: the exploration of European law can
start from them but definitely does not end with a mere quota-
tion from the CJEU or the ECtHR.
Except for Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz, which made some
observations about the EU legal system, both Lawrence and the
death penalty judgments drew from European sources but did
not investigate further. Since “judges are expected to be model
reason-givers,”408 underdeveloped lines of reasoning cast doubt
on their legitimacy. Quoting European law was not an issue by
itself. The problem occurs when the court quotes without under-
standing, or understands without explaining, why those foreign
materials mattered for the case at stake.
Proper contextualization and an adequate understanding of
the foreign concepts examined are particularly important. Their
importance is not limited to a country avoiding the importation
of concepts that do not fit within its structure. They are, first
and foremost, crucial because a lack of contextualization and un-
derstanding lend themselves to misunderstanding the same con-
cepts that a court finds inspiring. Being respectful of the nu-
ances of an entire legal system is necessary for the very compre-
hension of every aspect the court seeks to rely.
Overlooking the deep meaning of European law sources can do
much more than affect a single decision with a wrong depiction
of European law. It can have more profound and long-lasting im-
plications on several legal regimes. For example, let us consider
Lawrence and its impact on family law on a global scale. It
405. Armin von Bogdandy, Christoph Grabenwarter, & Peter M. Huber, Il
Diritto Costituzionale Nel Diritto Pubblico Europeo. L’esempio Della Rete Isti-
tuzionalizzata Della Giustizia Costituzionale [Constitutional Law in European
Public Law. The Example of Institutionalized Network of Constitutional Jus-
tice], RIVISTAAIC [MAG. AIC], Nov. 6, 2015, at 4 (It.).
406. ERINDALY, DIGNITYRIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THEWORTH OF
THEHUMAN PERSON 158 (2012).
407. Id.
408. Cohen, supra note 101, at 486.
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(mis)quoted Dudgeon and other ECtHR judgments that came af-
ter it, blending them with other arguments rooted in U.S. con-
stitutional law: the ultimate result consisted in the U.S. Su-
preme Court decision to strike down antisodomy laws. The court
in United States v. Windsor409 then quoted Lawrence twice to
strike down the Defense of Marriage Act.410 Similarly,Obergefell
v. Hodges,411 which affirmed the constitutional right to same-sex
marriage, quoted Lawrence twelve times.412 Since the court do-
mesticated Dudgeon in Lawrence, Windsor and Obergefell
simply quoted Lawrence as their precedent without needing to
look abroad. As Dudgeon’s impact on U.S. law lies beneath the
surface of Lawrence, its impact cannot be measured. But, of
course, Dudgeon flows within U.S. jurisprudence from Lawrence
up through Obergefell.
As a result, misreadings of foreign laws can bounce back and
affect the legal system from which they were taken. In Oliari &
Others v. Italy,413 the ECtHR sanctioned Italy for not providing
same-sex couples with any type of civil union. In its usual cur-
sory comparative law analysis,414 the ECtHR dedicated special
attention to the United States—the only country that the judges
analyzed that is not party to the ECHR.415 The relevant para-
graph of the decision is more than four hundred words long. 416
In few words, the ECtHR noticed and considered the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s recent decision on same-sex marriage, which was
built on ECtHR case law. Again, it is not possible to estimate the
impact of Obergefell on Oliari. Going backward, it is therefore
infeasible to trace back the relevance of Lawrence and, even fur-
ther,Dudgeon onOliari. It must be noted, however, that the EC-
tHR gave much more attention to Obergefell than what it gave
to its own Dudgeon decision, which is barely quoted in Oliari.417
409. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
410. Id. at 19, 23.
411. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
412. Id. at 2588–90, 2596, 2598–2600, 2602, 2604, 2606, 2620, 2623.
413. Oliari & Others v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11 & 36060/11, Eur. Ct. H.R,
HUDOC (Oct. 21, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-
156265”]}.
414. Id. at 15–18, ¶¶ 53–65.
415. Id. at 15, ¶¶ 53–55 (about individual state members), 15–17, ¶¶ 56–61
(the Council of Europe law), 17–18, ¶¶ 62–64 (EU law).
416. Id. at 13–14, ¶ 65.
417. Id. at 23, ¶ 95.
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This example illustrates that the Condorcet Theorem, which
undoubtedly is one of the theories that underpin the global judi-
cial dialogue among U.S. supporters of these transnational judi-
cial interactions,418 does not apply to this legal phenomenon of
quotations, borrowings, and transplants across Europe and the
United States. The Condorcet Theorem “suggests that the deci-
sion of a majority in a group of similar and independent decision-
makers is more likely to be correct than the decision of any one
member of that group.”419 The crucial idea here420 is decision-
maker independence.421 Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court acted
as an independent decision-maker when it decided to draw from
Dudgeon because it accepted inspiration from the ECtHR with
the understanding that the ECtHR has jurisprudence that as-
similates the human rights culture of dozens of European states.
In a sense, the U.S. Supreme Court treated the ECtHR as a syn-
thesis of independent states’ decisions. But, the Oliari decision,
which quotes Obergefell, lacks the same degree of independence.
Since Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law has incorpo-
rated the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. As a result, when Oliari
quotes Obergefell, to some extent, it is quoting itself.
Independence, however, is also hard to find within the EC-
tHR’s context. This is where the criticism about the Condorcet
Theorem becomes more radical. The Condorcet Theorem does
not consider the political and diplomatic pressure that is exerted
within Europe through the Council of Europe’s institutions.
It is routine to expect that countries willing to join the Euro-
pean Union will comply with the human rights standards that
the ECHR protects,422 as they are interpreted by the ECtHR it-
self and propagated through the European Commission for De-
mocracy Through Law (“Venice Commission”).423 This organ of
the Council of Europe elaborates criteria and standards of de-
mocratization for states that apply to join the Council of Europe
418. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 76, at 131.
419. Dothan, supra note 75, at 5.
420. See Rosenkranz, supra note 74, at 1284.
421. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 76, at 131.
422. See Tony Joris & Jan Vandenberghe, The Council of Europe and the Eu-
ropean Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
1, 22–24 (2008-2009); see also EUROPEAN UNION’S SHAPING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 123 (Dimitry Kochenov & Fabian Amtenbrink eds.,
2013).
423. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, The Venice Commission of the Council of Eu-
rope – Standards and Impact, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 585 (2014).
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and advises countries that are trying to reinforce or establish the
rule of law and human rights.424 Obviously, once they have en-
tered the European Union, states are expected to keep track of
both EU law and ECtHR case law. Therefore, a sort of triangu-
lation exists between 1) the EU Commission, which monitors
states’ accession to the European Union and their compliance
with EU law; 2) the ECtHR, which implements an expanding
interpretation of the ECHR; and 3) the Venice Commission,
which oversees the democratic effectiveness of political re-
gimes.425 Especially for countries willing to enter the European
Union, losing contact with one of these institutions could be det-
rimental for their relationship with the others.
The “independent decision-makers”426 that the Condorcet The-
orem envisions simply do not exist because of the political pres-
sure that is put on European states that join—or even try to ad-
here to—the European Union or the Council of Europe. Of
course, EU law is followed by twenty-eight European states, and
the ECtHR is “authoritative” (whatever this means) in forty-
seven countries. This does not mean, however, that these coun-
tries, acting as “independent decision-makers,” have embraced
wholeheartedly all the rules stemming from ECtHR case law.
The attractive power of the European Union and the ECtHR is
likely to prevail over states’ independent decision-making on
single issues.
It is therefore thanks to neither its popularity nor the number
of states that follow it that a European legal rule becomes rele-
vant for the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning. The Condorcet
Theory is not a good reason for considering the ECtHR’s deci-
sions or EU law. Rather, the value behind the practice of draw-
ing from supranational European legal culture lies in its rea-
soned judgment and capacity to shed light on the case at hand
in U.S. courts.
424. See Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, COUNCIL EUR.,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN
(last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
425. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 423, at 597.
426. Dothan, supra note 75, at 5.
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IV. A GOOD IDEA IS AGOOD IDEA, AS LONG AS IT IS
UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY: A FRESHU.S. READING OF
EUROPEAN SOURCES
The following Part will provide some examples of this alterna-
tive approach for the U.S. utilization of foreign sources. As al-
ready noted, in each context, European sources could have been
deployed more accurately and fruitfully as thought-provoking
ideas for the U.S. Supreme Court. Lawrence427 drew the conclu-
sion that laws criminalizing homosexual conduct are not part of
civilized societies fromDudgeon.428Given the number of dissents
in Dudgeon and Norris,429 this conclusion was not uncontrover-
sial, and European states were not quick to follow it, given that
Ireland kept the very legal provisions that Dudgeon sanctioned
with reference to Northern Ireland in Norris.
The ECtHR’s case law on this subject, however, points to one
crucial fact. Norris found that laws concerning homosexual con-
duct in and of themselves victimized this group, as they put a
social stigma on them.430 This is a powerful thought that the U.S.
Supreme Court could have elaborated on further in Lawrence in
connection with its own judgment that the mere existence of
such laws violated the U.S. Constitution,431 regardless of their
actual enforcement. There was something that Lawrence could
have learned from the ECtHR: namely, the impact of laws ban-
ning certain intimate conduct on human dignity. But, it was
found outside the part from where the court actually drew:
within the ECtHR’s legal reasoning rather than the outcome of
its decisions.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz432 is instructive in under-
standing how a comparative law inquiry should be conducted.
Justice Breyer got it right when he noted that normally, EU law
is enforced by states, and that EU institutions operate through
state organs. Ultimately, the European Union has secured a
427. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
428. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
429. See Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
430. Id. at 15–16, ¶ 46.
431. As stated specifically in the Lawrence majority opinion: “When homo-
sexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination
both in the public and in the private spheres.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
432. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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high level of compliance without burdening the European land-
scape with bureaucratic duplications of EU organs in each
state.433
Justice Breyer’s depiction of the EU model is accurate. But,
does this model fit with the U.S. constitutional infrastructure?
According to Justice Breyer, “comparative experience suggests”
that “there is no need to interpret” the U.S. Constitution as “for-
bidding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to any state
official.”434 The European Union, however, can hardly suggest
any specific interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in actuality.
The EU structure stems from the European Sonderweg,435 and
EU law scholars understand it to be uniquely European.436 If
Justice Breyer wanted to import it into U.S. constitutional law,
then he had the burden of proving that the “special way” fit
within the U.S. constitutional infrastructure.
Misunderstandings of European law abound also in the field
of death penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court thread of cases on this
issue have poorly utilized European sources. On the one hand,
the cases overlooked how abolitionism took over in Europe. To
reiterate, the abolition of the death penalty first took place in
Europe de facto when courts stopped enforcing it, then de jure.437
Moreover, the abolitionist trend took hold first state-by-state,
then at the supranational level.438 Finally, rather than through
judicial decisions, the death penalty was abolished mainly
through legislatures, either at the statutory or constitutional
level.439 All of these arguments could have suggested that the
U.S. Supreme Court proceed cautiously to avoid issuing judicial
rulings against capital punishment that would bind the states.
On the other hand, that does not consider the whole picture. The
European pressure will not cease until the death penalty is com-
pletely eradicated from the United States. The piecemeal deci-
sions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court have carved out ex-
ceptions from the main rule, which still allows for the death pen-
alty. The belief of European legal culture with respect to capital
punishment states that the death penalty is not only wrong for
433. Dickson, supra note 292.
434. Printz, 521 U.S. at 977.
435. Weiler, supra note 277, at 10.
436. See supra Part II.C.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
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juveniles or people with cognitive disabilities but also wrong in
and of itself. Thus, drawing from European sources means draw-
ing from this belief. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken inspiration from the European attitude toward capital
punishment, narrowed it down to specific circumstances, and
avoided considering the justifications for and the scope of this
attitude.
To summarize, the overall impression is that many European
citations were deployed mostly—if not exclusively—in order to
support U.S. Supreme Court decisions. They functioned as a sort
of “persuasive authority”440 for the reader rather than for the
court itself. Regardless of whether a foreign decision or law is
cited appropriately or not, the sources, nonetheless, lack any
binding authority.441 Decisions or laws promulgated abroad are
not authoritative. What is authoritative is what they highlight.
So long as the foreign sources are precise, they can broaden the
vision of the court that considers them and reveal facets of the
issues at stake.
If the status of foreign law is informative rather than norma-
tive, then the interest in the foreign legal experience broadens
to encompass, for instance, dissenting opinions or bills that
never passed into law. Each legal opinion can have useful in-
sights that the U.S. Supreme Court may consider interesting or
even relevant. Ultimately, foreign legal concepts do not set bind-
ing legal precedent because they are only controlling in those ju-
risdictions where they are decided. Yet, they are significant be-
cause they contribute intellectually to U.S. adjudication. As
scholarly works, their authoritativeness lies in their persuasive-
ness.442 In order to be persuasive, they must be fully detailed and
properly articulated. In other words, considerations of foreign
law cannot be generic or confined to mere quotations. Persuasive
authority thus requires the exclusion of both high levels of gen-
erality and superficial citations or references.
As a consequence, citations to foreign decisions lack normative
power. They simply point to a source of knowledge for the court.
They merely say where a concept was taken from, urge the au-
thor of the opinion to be accurate (since an inadequate depiction
440. McCrudden, supra note 126, at 502–03. H. Patrick Glenn elaborated on
the idea of “persuasive authority.” See Glenn, supra note 71, at 263–64.
441. See Schauer, supra note 98, at 1935–36.
442. Sacco, supra note 53, at 349.
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of foreign law will attract criticism), and provide a platform to
debate the benefits and drawbacks attached to them.
V. THE CORRECT EUROPEAN LESSONS FOR THEUNITED STATES
This short review of cases and legal ideas that the U.S. Su-
preme Court could have taken from the European legal culture
shows that quotations to foreign law are not selective in where
they draw materials from but rather in how they use them. More
precisely, citations overlook facets that could greatly contribute
to a better understanding of the case before the court. 443 The
remainder of this Part will condense what is missing in the pic-
ture the court has painted of European law and which approach
could have helped the court complete the picture. Some details
in the European Union and the ECHR institutions’ structures,
goals, and mechanisms make them unique. This does not mean
that their achievements cannot be imported or even understood;
it only means that such achievements become understandable
only if the political and legal processes through which they come
to life are taken into account. The issue of same-sex marriage
will be considered as a useful example.
A. Understanding the European Legal Tradition
Overall, the U.S. Supreme Court has used foreign quotations
from Europe to evolve its own laws,444 with the exception of Jus-
tice Breyer’s dissent in Printz, which is more nuanced. As a re-
sult, U.S. case law is currently in a state of fluctuation, swinging
back and forth between post-New Deal jurisprudence and New
Federalism.445 There is no doubt that Lawrence’s overruling of
Bowers changed the constitutional interpretation on the subject.
The same observation applies to the death penalty line of cases,
as the U.S. Supreme Court seems to be following European and
international abolitionist trends more broadly. From a European
perspective, the U.S. use of European sources to spur an evolu-
tion in U.S. law is not an absurd concept. Actually, it respects
the spirit of European constitutionalism (more precisely, that of
443. Stefano Bertea & Claudio Sarra, Foreign Precedents in Judicial Argu-
ment: A Theoretical Account, 7 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 140 (2014).
444. Rosenkranz, supra note 74, at 1303–04.
445. On the nuances of the so-called New Federalism, see Robert A.
Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORYL.J. 1,
18 (2006).
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the European Union and the Council of Europe). European Un-
ion law started as a political vision, but its mandate has come
together only piecemeal and through a process of trial and er-
ror.446 In a few words, its constitutional spirit lies in its pro-
cess,447 with the CJEU pursuing the best solution in light of the
EU project rather than the EU structure.448
Robert Schuman, the foreign minister of France who inspired
the formation of the European Communities, prophesized that
“Europe will not be built in a day, nor to an overall design.”449 A
few years later, envisioning an integrative process and not
simply a stable partnership with a long-lasting structure, the
founding European Economic Community Treaty determined “to
lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of
Europe.”450 This spirit sees European integration as a chain re-
action,451 with states deferring some of their powers to continen-
tal institutions with the expectation that this will trigger more
devolution of state powers to the European Union.452
The evolutionary approach is even more apparent in the con-
text of ECtHR case law. As we noticed earlier, the “living instru-
ment” approach sees the ECtHR’s meaning and scope adapt with
the changing needs of the society it serves. The ECtHR under-
stands its jurisprudence as incremental, as it envisions a pro-
gressive453 “triumph of constitutionalism, rights and the rule of
446. Koen Lenaerts, Interpretation and the Court of Justice: A Basis for Com-
parative Reflection, 41 INT’L LAW. 1011, 1017 (2007).
447. Fikfak, supra note 47, at 7.
448. Koen Lenaerts & Jose A. Gutierrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the
EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, 20 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 3, 51 (2014).
449. The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950, EUROPA, http://eu-
ropa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declara-
tion/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2016).
450. EEC Treaty.
451. Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, & Luigi Zingales, Monnet’s Error?, Fall
2014 Brookings Panel on Economic Activity (Sept. 11–12, 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/fall-
2014/fall2014bpea_guiso_sapienza_zingales.pdf.
452. Id.
453. Alastair Mowbray, The Creativity of the European Court of Human
Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 70 (2005).
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law.”454 It sees international law and constitutionalism as a “con-
tinuing, but not linear, process of the gradual emergence and
deliberate creation of constitutionalism elements in the interna-
tional legal order,”455 which adds new human rights alongside
older ones. Here, the dynamic is much more important than the
structure.456
The U.S. legal culture does not need to accept these European
views as a precondition to being inspired by European law. We
already noticed that some distinct European patterns—like the
idea that penal laws may put a social stigma on same-sex rela-
tions,457 the pan-European abolition of death penalty,458 or the
mechanizations of the European Union at the state level459—can
provide insight, or at least an interesting thought or idea, for the
U.S. Supreme Court (despite the fact that U.S. and European
constitutionalism stand on very different foundations). Ulti-
mately, some ideas can be decontextualized and used in a foreign
environment, but the importer must bear in mind their origin.
As Professor Paolo Carozza puts it: “We cannot really compare
two legal systems, or norms within them, without being con-
scious in the first instance of their differences.”460 If that notion
is correct, it becomes even more demanding to draw inspiration
from a different legal system in interpreting one’s own.
Overlooking important features in comparative law inquiries
does not simply mean misusing comparative law and potentially
altering the legal reasoning of a decision. It also enlists compar-
ative law in ideological controversies about constitutional inter-
pretation, creating a divide between progressively oriented
scholars and judges, who will look to comparative law with the
goal of changing their own law, and conservative judges, who
will avoid considering foreign law due to its alleged irrelevancy
and counterproductivity. This ideological connotation is not a
454. Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al., Editorial: Hard Times: Progressive Narratives,
Historical Contingency and the Fate of Global Constitutionalism, 4 J. GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM 11, 11–12 (2015).
455. Id.
456. For a discussion on the superiority of the process over the structure of
change, see Riccardo Prandini, The Future of Societal Constitutionalism in the
Age of Acceleration, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 731, 736 (2013).
457. See supra Part II.A.
458. See supra Part II.B.
459. See supra Part II.C.
460. Carozza, supra note 216, at 1233.
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necessary implication of using foreign law.461 Norris’s idea of le-
gal stigma upon homosexuals could have been more emphasized
in Lawrence. In Printz, Justice Scalia could have rebutted Jus-
tice Breyer precisely by saying that the EU model of integration
between national and supranational institutions is unique and
lies on completely different foundations than the U.S. federalist
system. Further, the European fight against the death penalty
could have been used by both legions. Conservatives could have
maintained that, even in Europe, the drivers of the death pen-
alty’s abolition were state legislatures. Progressive judges, on
the other hand, could have stated up front that Europe chal-
lenges the very idea that capital punishment is permissible and
directly tackled this issue. All these arguments are genuine in-
terpretations of European legal culture; none of them is apocry-
phal.
B. Obergefell and the ECtHR’s Case Law
Obergefell did not rely on foreign law, at least as far as one can
detect from the wording of the decision. But, the Sixth Circuit
decision in DeBoer,462 which created the split that the U.S. Su-
preme Court resolved underObergefell, drew from the ECtHR.463
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling is instructive, as it shows that com-
parative law can be a genuine enterprise but requires elabora-
tion in order to be helpful. On one hand, DeBoer pointed to the
fact that the U.S. Supreme Court could not simply ignore the
ECtHR’s attitude toward same-sex marriage after it had given
it some weight under other circumstances. On the other hand,
the judgment did not clarify how the ECtHR’s conclusion that
the issue fell within the states’ margin of appreciation464 reso-
nated with the rest of the Sixth Circuit decision. In other words,
Judge Sutton did not clarify whether the ECtHR’s attitude to-
ward same-sex marriage suggested that the issue should be left
to the political branches of the states—which is the approach
underpinning the decision he penned465—or that same-sex mar-
riage was unquestionably not protected under the ECHR. The
461. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 20, at 751.
462. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
463. See supra Introduction.
464. Id.
465. Specifically, Judge Sutton stated: “Better in this instance, we think, to
allow change through the customary political processes, in which the people,
gay and straight alike, become the heroes of their own stories by meeting each
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Sixth Circuit failed to draw conclusions from the depiction of the
European approach, although it portrayed the approach quite
accurately.
Overall, the Sixth Circuit opined that “foreign practice only re-
inforce[d] the impropriety of tinkering with the democratic pro-
cess in this setting.”466 Certainly, the circuit court’s phrasing
here may refer to a broader legal environment than that of the
ECtHR. But, if this is also the court’s reading of ECtHR case law
on the subject, then it is misplaced because the ECtHR does not
counterbalance the democratic process of any European state, as
it is not the ultimate form of legal redress in Europe.467 The EC-
tHR’s deferral to each country with respect to the issue of same-
sex marriage did not necessarily place the decision in the hands
of national parliaments. Different states balance their legisla-
tive and judicial powers differently.
The ECtHR’s line of decisions could have led the circuit court
to think that the Europeans have different takes on same-sex
marriage. But, then the circuit court should have also addressed
the ECtHR’s specification that the states’margin of appreciation
in the field was “still . . . a wide [one]”468 and that states enjoyed
discretion “in the timing of . . . legislative changes,”469 as the
Sixth Circuit reported in its judgment. Such expressions lend
themselves to the idea that the evolutionary approach of the EC-
tHR will, sooner rather than later, identify same-sex marriage
as a right in the ECHR. This point, however, is missing in the
Sixth Circuit decision. What the Sixth Circuit left in the penum-
bra must be brought to light in order to address this article’s
initial question: “If the U.S. Supreme Court explored European
legal culture in order to decide Obergefell,470 what would it have
learned?”
other not as adversaries in a court system but as fellow citizens seeking to
resolve a new social issue in a fair-minded way.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 421.
466. Id. at 417.
467. Gerards, supra note 207, at 22.
468. Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, 436.
469. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
470. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2016] Costs and Consequences of Incorrect Citations 201
At the time Obergefell was decided, the controlling ECtHR
case law on same-sex relationships was Schalk und Kopf v. Aus-
tria.471 In that decision, a section of the ECtHR decided that Aus-
tria’s failure to provide protection for same-sex couples did not
violate Article 12 of the ECHR, which states: “Men and women
of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a fam-
ily, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right.”472
The ECtHR acknowledged that the institution of marriage had
undergone “major social changes since the adoption of the
[ECHR].”473 But, there was “no European consensus regarding
same-sex marriage” because “no more than six out of forty-seven
Convention States” 474 provided such protections at the time
Schalk und Kopf was penned. The ECtHR acknowledged the ne-
cessity of being particularly prudent in developing its case law
further, since “marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural con-
notations which may differ largely from one society to an-
other.”475 The ECtHR itself concluded that it could “not rush to
substitute its own judgment in place of that of the national au-
thorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs
of society.”476
The ECtHR also analyzed the applicability to the case of Arti-
cle 8 of the ECHR, also in conjunction with Article 14, which for-
bids discrimination in the fields that are protected by the
ECHR,477 and concluded that the ECtHR did not protect same-
sex marriage, at least for the time being.478 It clarified that its
case law protected same-sex relationships under the label of
“private life,” but it never acknowledged that they constituted
471. Schalk & Kopf, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 409. The judgment dealt with
the issue of the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, either as marriage
or through alternative means.
472. ECHR, supra note 17, art. 12.
473. Schalk & Kopf, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 428.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 429.
476. Id.
477. “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, col-
our, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, as-
sociation with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” ECHR, su-
pra note 17, art. 14.
478. Schalk & Kopf, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 436–37.
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“family life.”479 Nevertheless, it noted a “rapid evolution of social
attitudes towards same-sex couples” and pointed out that “a con-
siderable number of member States” afforded some sort of legal
recognition to homosexual couples.480 This provided a basis for
the ECtHR to expand the scope of the protection of family life
afforded by the ECHR to same-sex couples.481
The acknowledgment that the “family life” umbrella also pro-
tected same-sex couples, however, did not provide direct legal
entitlements, such as their legal recognition.482 While the Euro-
pean community attempted to establish a consensus with re-
spect to providing same-sex partnerships with some form of pro-
tection,483 the ECtHR stated:
[T]here is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recog-
nition of same-sex couples. The area in question must therefore
still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established
consensus, where States must also enjoy a margin of apprecia-
tion in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes.484
Overall, Schalk und Kopf held that Austria did not violate the
ECHR, but, more significantly, it did not, in any sense, narrow
the states’ margin of discretion in dealing with these issues.
That said, the decision marks a significant step in the recogni-
tion of same-sex families, despite the fact that, for the time be-
ing, the ECtHR found it more prudent to defer the process of
recognition of same-sex relationships to the states.
After the Schalk und Kopf decision, the 2014 ECtHR case,
Hämäläinen v. Finland, focused on whether marriage ends if
one of the spouses changes his or her gender.485 In Hämäläinen,
the ECtHR reinforced the idea that the European Union lacked
a “consensus on allowing same-sex marriages,”486 and “reiter-
ate[d]” that there was no obligation on Contracting States to
grant same-sex couples access to marriage.”487
479. Id. at 435.
480. Id. at 436.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 438.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 5.
486. Id. at 19, ¶ 74.
487. Id. at 18–19, ¶ 71.
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As a result of Schalk und Kopf and Hämäläinen, by the end of
2014, three conclusions could have been drawn by the U.S. Su-
preme Court with respect to the ECtHR’s position on same-sex
relationships. First, the ECHR protected same-sex relation-
ships. Second, same-sex marriage, though protected, was not yet
an ECHR right. Third, given the “social and cultural connota-
tions”488 of marriage, states had a wide margin in deciding which
kinds of protections they wanted to grant to such relationships
and when to do it. At the time Schalk und Kopf andHämäläinen
were decided, it was the responsibility of the ECtHR to ensure
adequate protections for same-sex couples, but it was up to the
state to decide how and when to make it happen—either through
the extension of the institution of marriage (or through using
alternative solutions), the democratic process, or judicial review
(Schalk und Kopf speaks about “national authorities,”489 not
“legislatures”). These aspects could have informed the U.S. Su-
preme Court by shedding light on the status of family law in Eu-
rope and the concerns that surrounded it.
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court could have gone beyond
Schalk und Kopf and Hämäläinen by attempting to anticipate
how the ECtHR would interpret the issue of same-sex relation-
ships beyond 2014. The U.S. Supreme Court could have won-
dered if the growing European consensus that was still develop-
ing between 2010 and 2014, when Schalk and Kopf and Hämä-
läinen were decided, finally had become worthy of protection un-
der the ECHR by the time Obergefell was written in 2015. But,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s guess of what the ECtHR would say
on the topic beyond 2014 probably would have been exaggerated.
The most consolidated jurisprudence of the ECtHR said that Eu-
rope was moving toward the legal recognition of same-sex rela-
tionships. But the pace, the breadth, and the means through
which this would take place were largely in the hands of each
state.
CONCLUSION
This article demonstrated that U.S. constitutionalism and
comparative law can be reconciled. But, this cannot be done
simply by pulling the U.S. Supreme Court into the global dis-
course through scattered citations that take foreign law out of
488. Id. at 16, ¶ 62.
489. Id.
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context and that largely lack explanation for choosing one solu-
tion and leaving the others aside. The use of foreign sources can-
not simply lend itself to selectiveness and be characterized by a
normative attitude: these features are precisely the main criti-
cisms against the utilization of foreign law by the hands of the
court.
If engagement with comparative law is drawn out of this nor-
mative project, then it becomes a useful epistemological tool490—
namely, as a means to better understand the case at hand. A
better understanding of the facets of a controversy does not en-
tail normative implications and is not characterized by selective-
ness. It does not aim to look for a “better law”491 but rather seeks
a better understanding of the issues the court is called to judge.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s purview cannot extend to the
whole world, this effort surely will be plagued by incompleteness
but not by selectiveness.
If the normative side of the global law project is abandoned,
the U.S. Supreme Court will be free to simply ponder foreign le-
gal reasoning and keep them in mind while adjudicating cases.
The consideration of foreign legal thought will extend well be-
yond pure citations to explore the rationales behind the sources
to which a court pays attention. Justice Breyer makes an inter-
esting point in this regard, saying that the “[w]illingness to con-
sider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising
in a Nation that from its birth has given a ‘decent respect to the
opinions of mankind.’”492
But the mere citation of a decision, with no explanation of the
reasoning that would support the U.S. Supreme Court’s argu-
ments, does not really “respect” anyone’s “opinion.” The ap-
proach this article proposed, while decreasing the authority of
foreign law, broadens the possibilities of inquiry. Since well-
crafted and thoroughly understood concepts are what count, for-
eign decisions do not need to be cited for their holdings but for
their reasoning. Dissenting opinions can be more persuasive
than majorities; good observations can be found in contradictory
foreign results.493 Foreign concepts do not become relevant be-
cause they are quoted or because some jurisdiction espoused
them. They become persuasive only if they are well understood;
490. Hirschl, supra note 33, at 548.
491. But see Siems, supra note 392, at 119.
492. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
493. See Schauer, supra note 98, at 1944, 1947.
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and it is only within the context in which they are deployed that
they become meaningful. For the importing court, it is necessary
to understand the context in which the citations were shaped in
order to understand the concepts themselves. Then it takes an
additional effort for the importing court to understand if they fit
in the case at hand.
After all, if comparative law is a genuine, rational inquiry,
then there is no reason to leave meaningful foreign concepts and
concerns unexplored while judging.494 Rather, there is great rea-
son to understand them for what they mean and entail.
494. Glendon, supra note 23.
